It was believed that a disposable aircraft armed with 900 kilograms (2,000 lb) of explosives would potentially inflict heavy damage on important targets such as enemy shipping.
One month later, development was shelved at the direct order of Hitler, who had been encouraged by Albert Speer and Werner Baumbach not to pursue suicide attacks.
[2] In February 1944, Adolf Hitler was initially dismissive of the need to resort to tactics such as suicide attacks, as was advocated by figures such as Otto Skorzeny, Hanna Reitsch, and Hajo Herrmann, but he did authorise the formation of a squadron to prepare for such missions.
Volunteers for this squadron were required to sign a declaration which said, "I hereby voluntarily apply to be enrolled in the suicide group as part of a human glider-bomb.
"[5][6] The concept called for an aircraft that would be armed with a single 900 kilograms (2,000 lb) explosive device that would detonate upon impact with the target, which was typically envisioned to be Allied shipping.
[7] Two different aircraft were quickly considered to be the most suitable options available, the Messerschmitt Me 328 and the Fieseler Fi 103 (better known as the V-1 flying bomb), although both required development work.
The programme was placed under the supervision of the SS, but was not terminated at this point; instead, Skorzeny, who had been investigating the possibility of using crewed torpedoes against Allied shipping, was personally briefed by Hitler to revive the project.
[10][13] In the summer of 1944, the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Segelflug (German Research Institute for Sailplane Flight) at Ainring took on the task of developing a crewed version of the Fi 103, an example was made ready for testing within days and a production line was established at Dannenberg.
[14][13] The V-1 was transformed into the Reichenberg via the addition of a compact cockpit at the point of the fuselage that was immediately ahead of the pulsejet's intake, where the compressed-air cylinders were fitted on a standard V-1.
On 28 July 1944, Albert Speer wrote to Hitler, stating his opposition to the wasting of both men and machines on the Allies in France and suggested their deployment to be more worthwhile against Soviet power stations on the Eastern Front.
[23] By this point, the Allies had consolidated their position in France and thus the value of attacking potential invasion fleets was no longer considered to be as pressing as dealing with land warfare.