Given that his offensive had been halted in its initial phase, after two months of intense fighting, Kundt accepted the suggestion of the First Corps command to attack the Alihuatá fort by the same path that Captain Ustárez and Rivas had used before the war.

Kundt argued that his strategy did not depend on numerical superiority over the enemy but on the greater mobility, thrust and striking force of the Bolivian troops.

With the greatest secrecy, work was carried out at night on the opening of the road to prevent the Paraguayan aeroplanes from detecting the sappers.

Major Alfredo Rivas carried out an exploration with the riders of the "Lanza", arriving smoothly as far as Charata, to the west and in the vicinity of the target.

On March 10, an advanced Paraguayan patrol detected the Bolivian approach and gave the alarm to Captain Chircoff who was commanding the fort.

On the 13th, two patrols from the "Chacaltaya" advanced cautiously before the silence of the defenders, finding that the Alihuatá fort had been vacated by the enemy, taking advantage of the darkness of the night.

The 250 defenders had left the fort, leaving 40 mules, 12 head of cattle, a cart with food, 4 boxes of ammunition, 100 saddles, sabers, several rifles and some medical supplies.

With great haste, Estigarribia took some measures to dislodge the dangerous Bolivian intrusion, drawing forces from Fernández (Herrera) and Pirizal.

Once these maneuvers were completed, Lieutenant Colonel Bilbao Rioja objected to the excessive lengthening of the front,stretching from Corrales to Nanawa as a strategic weakness in the face of an enemy that had become defensive.