1941 1942 Associated articles The First Battle of El Alamein (1–27 July 1942) was a battle of the Western Desert campaign of World War II, fought in Egypt between Axis (German and Italian) forces of the Panzer Army Africa—which included the Afrika Korps under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel—and Allied (British Empire and Commonwealth) forces of the Eighth Army under General Claude Auchinleck.
Axis positions near El Alamein, only 106 km (66 mi) from Alexandria, were dangerously close to the ports and cities of Egypt, the base facilities of the Commonwealth forces and the Suez Canal.
However, the Axis forces were too far from their base at Tripoli in Libya to remain at El Alamein indefinitely, which led both sides to accumulate supplies for more offensives, against the constraints of time and distance.
The Mersa defence plan also included an armoured reserve but in its absence Ritchie believed he could organise his infantry to cover the minefields between the defended localities to prevent Axis engineers from having undisturbed access.
[c] He decided instead to employ delaying tactics while withdrawing a further 160 km (99 mi) or more east to a more defensible position near El Alamein on the Mediterranean coast.
Only 64 km (40 mi) to the south of El Alamein, the steep slopes of the Qattara Depression ruled out the possibility of Axis armour moving around the southern flank of his defences and limited the width of the front he had to defend.
The line the British chose to defend stretched between the sea and the Depression, which meant that Rommel could outflank it only by taking a significant detour to the south and crossing the Sahara Desert.
[18] Lieutenant-General William Norrie (General officer commanding [GOC] XXX Corps) organised the position and started to construct three defended "boxes".
[19] The Axis, too, believed that the capture of Egypt was imminent; Italian leader Benito Mussolini—sensing a historic moment—flew to Libya to prepare for his triumphal entry into Cairo.
Rommel had driven them forward ruthlessly, being confident that, provided he struck quickly before Eighth Army had time to settle, his momentum would take him through the Alamein position and he could then advance to the Nile with little further opposition.
The Italian XX Corps was to follow the Afrika Korps and deal with the Qattara box while the 133rd Armoured Division "Littorio" and German reconnaissance units would protect the right flank.
[25] Rommel had planned to attack on 30 June but supply and transport difficulties had resulted in a day's delay, vital to the defending forces reorganising on the Alamein line.
Once again, 90th Light failed to make progress so Rommel called the Afrika Korps to abandon its planned sweep southward and instead join the effort to break through to the coast road by attacking east toward Ruweisat Ridge.
[34] The next day, 3 July, Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps to resume its attack on the Ruweisat ridge with the Italian XX Motorised Corps on its southern flank.
[35] To the south, on 5 July the New Zealand group resumed its advance northwards towards El Mreir intending to cut the rear of the Ariete Division.
Heavy fire from the Italian 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" at El Mreir, however, 5 mi (8.0 km) north of the Qattara box, checked their progress and led XIII Corps to call off its attack.
The Allied Desert Air Force (DAF) was concentrating fiercely on his fragile and elongated supply routes while British mobile columns moving west and striking from the south were causing havoc in the Axis rear echelons.
[46] Following a bombardment which started at 03:30 on 10 July, the Australian 26th Brigade launched an attack against the ridge north of Tel el Eisa station along the coast (Trig 33).
The bombardment was the heaviest barrage yet experienced in North Africa, which created panic in the inexperienced soldiers of the Italian 60th Infantry Division "Sabratha" who had only just occupied sketchy defences in the sector.
[58][59][60][61] On 12 July, the 21st Panzerdivision launched a counter-attack against Trig 33 and Point 24, which was beaten off after a 2½-hour fight, with more than 600 German dead and wounded left strewn in front of the Australian positions.
[69] Possibly the most important feature of the battle, however, was that the Australians had captured Signals Intercept Company 621, which had been providing Rommel with priceless intelligence from British radio communications.
While—with help from mobile infantry and artillery columns from 7th Armoured Division—they pushed back the Axis probe with ease, they were prevented from advancing north to protect the New Zealand flank.
The New Zealand attack took their objectives in the El Mreir depression[93] but, once again, many vehicles failed to arrive and they were short of support arms in an exposed position.
[96] However, XIII Corps commander—Lieutenant-General William Gott—rejected this and ordered the attack but on a centre line 1 mi (1.6 km) south of the original plan which he incorrectly believed was mine-free.
[96] At 17:00, Gott ordered 5th Indian Infantry Division to execute a night attack to capture the western half of Ruweisat ridge and Deir el Shein.
[103] The Eighth Army was exhausted, and on 31 July Auchinleck ordered an end to offensive operations and the strengthening of the defences to meet a major counter-offensive.
Rommel was later to blame the failure to break through to the Nile on how the sources of supply to his army had dried up and how: then the power of resistance of many Italian formations collapsed.
[110] According to Dr James Sadkovich and others, Rommel often displayed a distinct tendency to blame and scapegoat his Italian allies to cover up his own mistakes and deficiencies as a commander in the field.
He believed that because Rommel understood that with the passage of time the Allied situation would only improve, he was compelled to attack as soon as possible and before the end of August when he would have superiority in armour.
[119] Members of this battalion have been labelled war heroes since, such as commander Frederick Baker, James Henare and Eruera Te Whiti o Rongomai Love, the last of whom was killed in action.