Using tactics first developed against the Japanese in New Guinea during the Second World War, the Australians gained the advantage of the high ground and assaulted the PVA positions from unexpected directions.

They then repelled repeated PVA counterattacks aimed at re-capturing Maryang San and Kowang-san (the latter on 12 October), with both sides suffering heavy casualties before the Australians were finally relieved by a British battalion.

In July the Kansas and Wyoming Lines were strengthened, while a limited offensive in the east-central sector in mid-August seized the high ground around the Punchbowl and Bloody Ridge.

[5] Meanwhile, the organisation of British Commonwealth ground forces fighting in Korea as part of the UN Command had undergone considerable change in the months following the battles of the Imjin River and Kapyong in late-April 1951.

Meanwhile, after protracted negotiations between the governments of Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand and South Africa, agreement had been reached to establish an integrated formation with the aim of increasing the political significance of their contribution, as well as facilitating the solution of the logistic and operational problems faced by the various Commonwealth contingents.

[9] Peace-talks at Kaesong during July and September led to a lull in the fighting and 3 RAR undertook mainly defensive duties, helping to construct the defences of the Kansas Line south of the Imjin River, as well as conducting extensive patrolling on the northern side.

The period culminated in a limited, and largely unopposed, divisional advance 12 kilometres (7.5 mi) north of the Imjin to the Wyoming Line, codenamed Operation Minden, in September.

[11] Careful reconnaissance and planning took place in the week prior to the commencement of the operation and Taylor emphasised the use of indirect fires, air support and infiltration tactics to limit casualties, as well as the exploitation of weak points in the PVA defences.

[22][23] By 08:00 B Company had gained the high ground to the north and then proceeded to patrol the short distance to west to the objective which was then taken with three wounded; five PVA were killed and one captured.

[26] Meanwhile, led by a bagpiper, the Borderers made a simultaneous assault up the western face of Kowang-San, and fearing they may be caught between two attacks the PVA defenders abandoned Hill 355, withdrawing northwest under heavy indirect fire.

[23] Given the strong resistance exhibited by the PVA, the Canadians expected a tough fight as 25th Brigade prepared to assault its objectives as part of the second phase of the divisional plan.

[28] On 12 October, 2 PPCLI commanded by Lt. Col. James Riley Stone repelled a large force of at least a battalion of PVA attackers during a night action, exacting heavy casualties.

[26] The previous attempts to capture Maryang San had failed due to the approach to steep eastern slopes of the feature being across a wide, open valley that was dominated by enfilade fire from mutually supporting PVA positions.

[32] B Company—commanded by Captain Henry Nicholls—led off shrouded in the heavy mist, and with visibility limited in the thick vegetation, it drifted to the right off the intended axis of advance having lost direction, suffering a similar fate as the Fusiliers.

[41] Meanwhile, D Company continued to press their attack along the high ground towards the 'Uniform' feature, assaulting the deeply entrenched PVA positions, which included heavy automatic weapons.

[46] Now with Maryang San captured the Australians began digging-in, modifying the south-facing linear PVA trench system into an all-round defensive position with mutually supporting weapons pits.

[50] As such for the next assault, planned for the morning, the Fusiliers would detach their reserve company to attack the Hinge from the east, using the Australian positions on Maryang San as a firm base and thereby allowing them to outflank their opponents on Hill 217.

Without fire support and outnumbered, the Australians immediately conducted a quick attack and, using grenades and bayonets, they inflicted heavy casualties on the PVA before forcing the survivors to withdraw.

[53] Although subjected to constant shelling, 9 Platoon continued to hold the knoll, repelling several counterattacks over the next 13 hours, cutting down each assault through the tree-line and long grass with accurate rifle and machine-gun fire, forcing the PVA to withdraw leaving their dead and wounded behind.

[36] In preparation, they ascended Hill 317 late in the afternoon of 6 October, finally securing the crest, and at last light joined 9 Platoon on the knoll northwest of the summit where they would form up the next day to conduct the assault.

[55] Hassett moved the 3 RAR tactical headquarters on to Hill 317 just before the assaulting troops stepped off the line of departure, allowing him to direct the battle from a forward position and to co-ordinate fire support.

Throughout the night of 7/8 October the Hinge was attacked on three occasions from both the front and the flanks by a force of battalion strength, however the Australians beat back the PVA in desperate hand-to-hand combat.

[43][59] In order to preserve its remaining strength, the PVA 191st Division was forced to pull back by 3 kilometres (1.9 mi), surrendering the control of Hill 217 without a fight.

[67] Despite difficulties, an adequate flow of ammunition, equipment, food and water was maintained, although there were occasions when the Australians endured thirst and hunger for several hours.

The tanks had often operated in terrain to which they were unsuited, while the New Zealand gunners had fired over 50,000 rounds in direct support of 3 RAR, blistering the paint off the barrels of their guns.

[73] During the fighting, a PVA company had defended their positions from a U-shaped tunnel capable of housing 100 men, which had served as both a bomb shelter and a base for counterattacks.

[73] Impressed by the report, the PVA commander Peng Dehuai, later ordered the construction of 30-metre (98 ft) deep tunnels along the entire front line, and it formed a formidable obstacle for UN forces to overcome during the stalemate period.

It was replaced by a static war characterised by fixed defences, trench lines, bunkers, patrols, wiring parties and minefields reminiscent of the Western Front in 1915–17.

[80] Yet even as the war became a contest of positional warfare and attrition, growing western political sensitivities ensured that UN commanders were increasingly mindful of limiting casualties.

[86] Throughout the operation 3 RAR had played a crucial role, and in a bold series of holding and flanking movements, coordinated with accurate and sustained artillery and direct tank fire, it had driven the PVA from both Kowang-San and Maryang San.