The Court held that the state-allowed re-sale provision did not constitute state action, and thus, the plaintiff did not possess a colorable federal due process claim.

The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in part, that "[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

Pointing out that Brooks had failed to name any governmental entity as a defendant, Rehnquist went on to argue that "very few" functions have been exclusively carried out by state governments.

[2] In American history, the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors was not, in Rehnquist's view, a function performed exclusively by the state, as the parties typically retained other avenues of remedy.

Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall authored a short dissenting opinion, emphasizing what he perceived as the Court's "attitude of callous indifference to the realities of life for the poor.