Satō Tetsutarō, who would become a future influence on Japanese naval strategy in the interwar period, established the principle of the Big Gun based on his inferences from Tsushima.

[7] Such doctrine regarding the United States as a primal budgetary threat to the IJN became internalized and justified within the naval ministry as "maintaining balance" with a US navy that sought to become "second to none".

[8] The Japanese imposition of the 21 Demands and Nishihara Loans further worsened relations with the west, which combined with evolving British Commonwealth interests and the looming Washington Naval Conference would result in the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The IJN also undertook the construction of secret military installations in Micronesia, in violation of demilitarization laws concerning the administration of the region.

[12] Following Woodrow Wilson's renewal of a shipbuilding program increasing the strength of the US Navy, the Imperial Diet, pressured by the IJN, approved a motion calling for the expansion of Japan's fleet to include eight battleships and eight battlecruisers.

[14] Tomosaburo concluded that the cost of constructing such a large fleet would amount to financial ruin for Japan, which was under the strain of a post war economic recession.

[14] The navy ministry, trying to avoid an arms race while under adverse financial and budgetary restrictions, accepted an invitation to the Washington Naval Conference.

[14] The Japanese diet concurrently passed a resolution calling for a reduction in arms spending, which had grown to 48% of Japan's budgetary expenses.

[18] Kanji was reinforced by the Naval Affairs Research Committee for the League of Nations, which stated that any ratio under the 70 percent strength limit was non negotiable.

[18] Tomosaburo had already told the senior naval staff, including admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, his position, resulting in Kanji's maneuver being ultimately futile.

[20][note 2] Tomosaburo's subordinates in the Navy Ministry would continue the "Washington Naval Treaty System" after his death from colon cancer, weakening opposition to the Kantaiha.

[24] Kanji was appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet in August 1927, where he instituted massive training exercises to make up for the navy's inferiority in tonnage with the western powers.

[29] The conflict between the two factions continued to boil as Kato Kanji resigned in the aftermath of the 1930 treaty, refusing to accept the naval board's negotiated position on tonnage strength.

[30] Former naval minister Takabe Takereshi was forcibly retired to the reserves in the early 1930s and was subject to an assassination attempt by junior officers in the navy.

[30] "Pragmatic officers" such as Teikichi Hori and Yamanashi Katsunoshin were dismissed from high command by Mineo Osumi, who was under the influence of the faction.