The Kriegsmarine (Navy) and its commander-in-chief Erich Raeder saw this as an opportunity to destroy the sea communications of the United Kingdom, Germany's last significant opponent in Europe.

In February 1941, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) was ordered by Adolf Hitler to form a naval air command to support the Kriegsmarine's U-boat operations in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Along with reconnaissance and anti-shipping operations, Fliegerführer Atlantik provided fighters for air superiority to cover U-boat transit routes in the Bay of Biscay against RAF Coastal Command.

Although this did not translate into permission to develop naval aircraft, by 1927 the Germans were initiating secret training and design programs at Warnemünde under the guise of Radio Experimental Command.

[5] Göring's logic in having an independent air force was militarily prudent but the future Reichsmarschall saw the new Luftwaffe as a personal power base as well as a crucial war weapon and would not divide it with the navy.

At the meeting, held on 11 March, Raeder handed Göring a detailed memorandum asking for naval aviation to be seconded, permanently, to the navy as it was in the best position to understand naval–air requirements.

Blomberg summarily confirmed the current proposals but the meeting did not completely resolve the question over which service should be responsible for aerial operations at sea, with aircraft carrier forces a future consideration.

Göring did not openly reject the claim of the navy on technical grounds, nor did he deny the importance of air power in sea warfare, which gave him plenty of latitude in discussions.

Resembling the policies of Admiral Zemker, doctrine produced under Walter Wever's tenure as Chief of the General Staff (1933–1936) relegated naval concerns to fourth place on the list of priorities in the Conduct of the Air War in 1935—which remained unchanged.

The strategic advantage gained by the possession of French air and naval bases on the Atlantic coast put German U-boats and aircraft about 700 mi (1,100 km) closer to the critical Allied shipping lanes and within range of British ports in the south, east, west and north.

The shortcomings of the Luftwaffe in this regard were not readily apparent, for the threat from German aircraft against unarmoured and slow merchant ships and even warships on occasion, had been proven in the Norwegian Campaign.

Göring and his chief of staff, Hans Jeschonnek, thought an aerial assault on mainland Britain would destroy its armament factories, the Royal Air Force (RAF) and British morale.

The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) hoped peace negotiations would avoid a hazardous amphibious landing in Britain, code-named Operation Sea Lion (Seelöwe), from being carried out.

Raeder and Karl Dönitz, commander of the U-boat force, believed the diversion of the Luftwaffe to these tasks was a wasted opportunity and interfered with the demands of the naval staff for support and reconnaissance in the Battle of the Atlantic.

[32][33] In 1941 British port cities suffered intensive air raids—the Plymouth, Hull, Cardiff, Bristol, Clydebank and Belfast Blitz suggest the OKL adhered to the new directive.

By the end of the air offensive over Britain in May 1941, as the Germans prepared for the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), the Luftwaffe had, on occasion, done serious damage to these port targets.

[42] It is estimated by April, 1941, Fliegerführer Atlantik had on strength 21 Fw 200s, 26 He 111s, 24 Heinkel He 115s, and a mixed force of Messerschmitt Bf 110s and Junkers Ju 88s, numbering 12 aircraft.

When a Condor attempted to manoeuvre to avoid anti-aircraft fire or enemy fighters, its weak structure could be damaged, causing metal fatigue and cracks, resulting in the loss of the aircraft.

The British failed to disrupt production at the Focke-Wulf plant at Bremen or to destroy more Condors in the field, due to poor bombing accuracy and improved German defences.

U-boats were unable to make accurate navigation using sun or star sightings and even when convoys were located they had trouble homing in bombers because their short-range transmitters were too weak to reach the aircraft.

Dönitz' decision irritated Harlinghausen, who planned a major offensive in the summer and the relations between the two men cooled, only to warm again when the aircraft reverted to reconnaissance roles supporting U-boats—ironically because shipping defences had proven so successful Fw 200s could only attack when they had cloud cover.

While this gave German submarines plenty of targets, the order to send more vessels to American waters made less U-Boats available for cooperation with Fliegerführer Atlantik.

Italian-designed aerial torpedoes (F5a) had proven successful in the Regia Aeronautica (Royal Italian Air Force) and in the Luftwaffe, but these weapons were given to KG 26 and other units operating against shipping in the Mediterranean Sea and against the Arctic convoys off Norway.

[88] The development of the aerial torpedo remained in the hands of the Kriegsmarine, and it was not until 1941 the Luftwaffe was finally granted jurisdiction and proceeded with urgency thus the first two years of war were wasted and little progress had been made.

In 1942, he wrote of the Baedeker Blitz; My impression in the majority of cases, the aim of our sorties at present is more to placate the High Command than to cause any serious discomfort to the enemy.

The operational strength of Kessler's forces were very low and only reconnaissance missions could be carried out and attacks on coastal shipping when weather permitted when RAF Fighter Command could not intervene.

He requested defensive operations and reconnaissance missions to protect his submarines in transit from French ports in Saint-Nazaire, Bordeaux, Brest, Lorient and La Pallice to the Atlantic Ocean.

Later, FuG Neptun-S (136 MHz) was trialled off Norway but both proved disappointing when compared to a captured 200MHz British metric Air-to-surface MK II radar.

On the Eastern Front, the Battle of Stalingrad led to the encirclement of several Axis armies and FW 200s, with other long range types, were required to supply land forces trapped in the city.

Operation Derange followed when 19 Group deployed 70 ASV III equipped B-24 Liberators, Vickers Wellingtons and Handley Page Halifax aircraft.