Towards the end of the Second World War, the German Army introduced Kampfgruppe combat formations, which were composed of whatever units happened to be available.
Though poor quality ones generally constituted the major part of them, they often performed successfully because of their high degree of flexibility and adaptability.
Mission-type tactics, as opposed to extremely specific directives, which give no discretion to the junior commander, are now widely used by modern militaries because of their force multiplication.
Boyd's doctrine is widely taught in the American military, and one of the aims of network centric warfare is to "get inside his OODA loop."
Network-centric warfare can provide additional information and can help prevent friendly fire but also allows "swarm tactics"[4] and the seizing of opportunities by subordinate forces.
(Edwards 2000, p. 2) defines "a swarming case is any historical example in which the scheme of maneuver involves the convergent attack of five (or more) semiautonomous (or autonomous) units on a targeted force in some particular place.
Two new weapons of World War I, barbed wire and the machine gun, multiplied defensive forces, leading to the stalemate of trench warfare.
Carriers can hold different type of aircraft to different usage meaning the force multiplier can vary depending on the specific task at hand.
Tankers can also be used to rapidly deploy fighters, bombers, SIGNET, Airborne Command Post, and cargo aircraft from the United States to the areas where they are needed.
Modern PGMs commonly put a bomb within 3–10 meters of its target (see circular error probable), and most carry an explosive charge significant enough that this uncertainty is effectively voided.
The fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed to the World War II Germans as the main force for the invasion of Europe.
Operation Bodyguard[10] successfully gave the impression that FUSAG was to land at the Pas de Calais, convincing the Germans that the real attack at Normandy was a feint.
FUSAG's existence was suggested by the use of decoy vehicles that the Allies allowed to be photographed, fictitious radio traffic generated by a small number of specialists, and the Double Cross System.