This outcome effectively deprived the Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet of air cover for future operations, which proved decisive during the Battle of Leyte Gulf later in October.

[1] Anticipating the various options open to American landing forces, the Japanese operational order, code named Sho ("victory"), envisioned four scenarios numbered from one to four.

Sho-1 (Ichi), 2 (Ni), 3 (San), and 4 (Yon) were meant to defend respectively the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa, the Japanese homeland, and Hokkaido plus the Kuril Islands.

To restore morale, the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Soemu Toyoda flew out to the front in early October to rally the troops behind Sho.

[4] The Japanese navy had formed a special air unit called the T Attack Force (T攻撃部隊, T Kōgeki Butai), the "T" short for "typhoon" (台風, taifū), to experiment with rough-weather training.

[5] This strategy, along with night operations and submarine warfare, was meant to compensate for Japan's smaller fleet compared to that of the United States by flying missions in weather conditions that the Americans were not trained for.

However, like other Japanese units at the time, the T Attack Force suffered from a shortage of pilots, even after recruiting green fliers directly from the army.

Toyoda could not risk a return trip home through a concentrated enemy carrier force that now embarked more than 1,000 aircraft,[note 1] especially not after previous Combined Fleet commanders had been lost during aerial engagements.

Out of position and with inadequate lines of communication, the response to such overwhelming enemy air power was left to Toyoda's Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka.

[6] Kusaka correctly saw these strikes as a precursor to U.S. troop landings, in part due to Imperial Navy intelligence collected over the previous week.

[7] Because he was still unsure exactly where enemy forces would land, he chose to execute the air component of Sho-1 or Sho-2 – the planned defense of the Philippines or Formosa, respectively – on the morning of 10 October.

[9][3] Although this represented a huge number of available aircraft, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service (IJNAS) was still recovering from losses suffered at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June.

[3] Throughout the day and night of 11 October, radar-equipped Japanese reconnaissance aircraft sighted various task groups of the Third Fleet, giving area commanders on Formosa and in the Philippines early warning.

Because the Japanese were on alert, Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters from all four groups were intercepted by enemy aircraft and moderate to intense anti-aircraft fire was universally reported.

[3] American carrier air groups had suffered minimal personnel losses with nine U.S. aircraft shot down with three pilots subsequently recovered by nearby ships or submarines.

Even though there were some experienced Japanese naval aviators operating at this time, IJNAS Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter units reconstituted after the Battle of the Philippine Sea were still learning to work together and did not execute the kind of section or division flying that yielded tactical advantage.

[19] In addition, Japanese commander Shigeru Fukudome observed that while planes in his units caught fire almost immediately upon receiving damage, American fighters were less likely to ignite.

U.S. Navy ships made smoke for cover and engaged in radical maneuvering to keep enemies astern as Japanese aircraft dropped flares to illuminate their targets.

Even though a wider array of targets was assigned to the task groups, from the Pescadores to northern Luzon and Formosa, far fewer enemies were encountered in the air.

Japanese formations were spotted via radar at 16:40 and intercepted by Combat Air Patrol (CAP) planes from TG 38.4's USS Belleau Wood an hour later.

A subsequent group of six Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers which had penetrated the picket and evaded the CAP made determined attacks on the carriers of TG 38.4, putting four torpedoes in the water before all six were shot down by shipboard anti-aircraft guns.

Ten Yokosuka P1Y "Frances" bombers made contact with the group at 18:23 after eluding early radar detection by flying low over the water.

Though visual contact was made and shipboard anti-aircraft fire destroyed six planes, one Frances pressed home a determined torpedo attack on the carriers.

Early morning fighter sweeps were launched to suppress air power on Luzon and Formosa while the newly formed task group attempted to escort Canberra to safety.

A formation of 25 Yokosuka D4Y "Judy" dive bombers, using cloud cover to evade detection, was intercepted by the group's combat air patrol.

Evasive maneuvers, squall weather, and poor fighter cover on the part of the Japanese helped TG 38.3 escape without suffering any significant damage.

Faced with the decision to either scuttle or protect the damaged cruisers, advisers to Admiral William Halsey Jr., the commander of the U.S. 3rd Fleet, convinced him to turn a bad situation into an opportunity.

[46] The torpedo struck the after portion of the starboard side of the Houston, blowing 20 men overboard and spreading gasoline fires in the waters around the cruiser.

Even those unconvinced members of the IJN, up to and including Admiral Soemu Toyoda of the Combined Fleet, believed some kind of victory had been achieved off Formosa.

[3] Upon realizing the scale of the Japanese defeat suffered on 12 October alone, Vice Admiral Fukudome lamented, "Our fighters were nothing but so many eggs thrown at the stone wall of the indomitable enemy formation.