Forward air control operations during the Korean War
The U.S. Marine Corps' system depended on an organic supporting air wing delivering ordnance within 1,000 yards of front-line troops; this was to compensate for their weakness in artillery caused by being an amphibious force.
Tactical air power, including CAS, was largely instrumental in staunching communist offensives as the opposing forces swept back and forth in mobile warfare.
Though only United Nations air superiority from the earliest days of the war made "Mosquito" operations possible, other FACs also inflicted serious casualties on the communists.
The U.S. Marine fought an amphibious war as light infantry supported by little artillery fire; consequently, they directed air strikes on targets within 1,000 yards of their own forces.
To complicate matters, unreliable maps available bore widespread mistakes and confusions in town names, and portrayed terrain features as far as 1,000 meters out of true.
[14] Nevertheless, two weeks into the war, Lieutenant Colonel Stanley P. Latiolas, operations officer of the Fifth Air Force, suggested having a slower airplane spot targets for the fuel-hog jets.
Colonel John R. Murphy, familiar with the Horsefly FACs of World War II, asked General Earle E. Partridge for five pilots to fly reconnaissance.
On 9 July 1950, Lieutenants James A. Bryant and Frank G. Mitchell flew the first airborne FAC missions of the Korean War from K-5 Taejon Air Base.
Their utility was limited because the FAC had to remain with his MRC108 radio jeep while ordering air strikes, making a very visible target for enemy shellfire.
Communist Chinese "volunteers" under General Lin Biao launched massive ground assaults on the UN forces, driving them back to the south.
Their "Allied Joint Headquarters" at Antung was supposed to direct Chinese and North Korean air efforts; however, it was run by Russian advisers.
An 8th Army intelligence report issued the following day estimated communist casualties at 38,000 killed; 18,820 of those dead were credited to tactical air strikes.
In one notable incident, on 3 February 1951, ten tactical air sorties directed by "Mosquito Cobalt" near Yang-pyong killed an estimated 300 communists.
In another combat on 12 February, "Mosquito Liberator" controlled three flight of fighter-bombers that blasted a trapped South Korean battalion free of communist road-blocks.
Constant rotating coverage by P-51 Mustangs and F4U Corsairs helped the FAC pilots become familiar with their areas, and thus quicker to spot and attack enemy activity.
"Mosquito" T-6s directed 108 sorties of protective close air support on the nearby enemy, while Task Force Growden pushed northwards to squeeze the communists.
Lacking the institutional memory to recall prior experience during World War II, the Americans reinvented all-weather bombing and night FAC operations.
In mid-May, radar guided night air strikes killed communist troops within 400 yards of the U.S. 2nd Division, to General Almond's delight.
On 1 July 1951, North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung and General Peng Te-huai agreed to a cease fire as both sides settled into fixed positions.
Although it did not categorize results, a considerable portion of the cited 120,000 communist casualties were inflicted by FAC directed close air support.
North Korean General Nam Il later remarked, during armistice negotiations, that only U.S air power and naval gunfire had prevented his side from prevailing.
[35] During Summer 1951, the two opposing sides settled into their own growing network of trenches a la World War I, and the forward air control situation changed.
Tactical air direction centers would not only detect inbound enemy aircraft, but control protective night interceptors and anti-aircraft batteries.
However, UN divisional commanders felt they "owned" the right to close air support missions, and continued to demand their perceived share of strike sorties.
Almond's belief that tactical air squadrons should be parceled out to support individual infantry divisions harked back to the doctrine of early World War II.
After widespread interviews with commanders from battalion level upwards, the team concluded the existing field expedient system was effective.
Although the Army representatives on the board thought Tactical Air Control Parties should be stationed down to battalion level, they recognized it was impossible under the circumstances.
Despite his parent X Corps being supported by two-thirds of the CAS sorties flown, Marine General Gerald C. Thomas believed his 1st Division was shortchanged.
On 20 December, in a letter to General Matthew Ridgway, Van Fleet wanted a Marine squadron parceled out to each corps; they would fly "close interdiction" missions within 40 miles of the front under control of Army artillery observers.
After stating that he had not assumed command in Korea to aggravate Army-Air Force contentions over forward air control, he reviewed the ongoing dispute.
