[4] He is a directeur d’études at EHESS and the Director of Institut Jean-Nicod, a research lab in philosophy, linguistics and cognitive science under the aegis of the Ecole Normale Supérieure.
This was evident in his works where he drew from the radical contextualist view of predication and the attributive distinction for definite descriptions, citing their relevance in the revival of this philosophical tradition.
[8] The second involve “context-dependence in language and thought” while the third focused on “the theory of reference and the analysis of singular concepts, construed as mental files.”[8] In his review of Literal Meaning in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,[9] Jason Stanley cited how Recanati maintained that what is intuitively said by an utterance is affected by context in ways that could not be explained by any combination of Chomsky, Montague, and Grice (that is, ordinary syntax and semantics, together with Gricean pragmatics) (1993, pp. 227–274).
[12] He described simulation as a psychological mechanism critical in understanding metarepresentation, particularly in the way this concept is viewed as ipso facto transparent.
[14] Bach opened his review with the comment that "If you're unfamiliar with the title phrase of François Recanati's latest book, you'll naturally think he's proposing an alternative to truth-conditional semantics.
"[14] and summed up by saying "Thanks to Recanati's openness to diverse approaches, his fairness in critically examining competing views, his carefully nuanced argumentation, and his general thoroughness, to my mind the main rewards offered by the book Truth-Conditional Pragmatics can be derived by delving into its details.
"[14] For his part, Stanley commented that "the problem with Recanati's appeal to circumstances of evaluation to justify incomplete semantic contents is that it is in tension with much of current linguistic research.