France–Africa relations
[6] In 1402, the French adventurer Jean de Béthencourt left La Rochelle and sailed along the coast of Morocco to conquer the Canary Islands.
[10] In July 1533 Francis received Ottoman representatives at Le Puy, and in return he dispatched Antonio Rincon to Barbarossa in North Africa and then to Suleiman in Asia Minor.
[15][16] Bérard was succeeded by Arnoult de Lisle and then Étienne Hubert d'Orléans in the position of physician and representative of France at the side of the Sultan.
In order to continue the exploration efforts of his predecessor Henry IV, Louis XIII considered a colonial venture in Morocco and sent a fleet under Isaac de Razilly in 1619.
In 1624, he was put in charge of an embassy to the pirate harbour of Salé in Morocco, in order to solve the affair of the library of Mulay Zidan.
[19] This treaty gave France preferential treatment, known as Capitulations: advantageous tariffs, the establishment of a consulate, and freedom of religion for French subjects.
Treaties with the nationalists under `Abd al-Qādir enabled the French to first focus on the elimination of the remaining Ottoman threat, achieved with the 1837 Capture of Constantine.
[22] The war was formally ended September 10 with the signing of the Treaty of Tangiers, in which Morocco agreed to arrest and outlaw Abd al-Qādir, reduce the size of its garrison at Oujda, and establish a commission to demarcate the border.
He managed to keep France together while taking steps to end the war, much to the anger of the Pieds-Noirs (Frenchmen settled in Algeria) and the military; both previously had supported his return to power to maintain colonial rule.
[26] Under close supervision from the president, French advisors played a major role in civil and military affairs, thwarted coups, and, occasionally, replaced upstart local leaders.
De Gaulle's goals were to protect its nearby ex-colonies from Nigeria, to stop Soviet advances, and to acquire a foothold in the oil-rich Niger delta.
[28] Socialist rhetoric had long attacked the imperialistic program of the French overseas empire, and its continuity in Francophone Africa after those states gained independence.
[30] The French daily newspaper Le Monde printed newly declassified government memos and diplomatic telegrams revealing Mitterrand's support for Habyariamana's regime on July 6, 2007.
The official French policy was to push Habyarimana in sharing power, while stopping Paul Kagamé's FPR's military advance, supported by Uganda.
[31] On April 2, 1993, after an agreement between Habyarimana and Kagamé which prepared the August 1993 Arusha Accords, conservative Prime minister Edouard Balladur envisioned sending 1,000 more soldiers, a proposition accepted by Mitterrand.
[31] The documents prove that the French government was aware of ethnic cleansings committed by Hutu extremists as soon as February 1993, a year before the assassination of Habyarimana which triggered a full-scale genocide.
