He participated in the Siege of Ancona in 1814 and in Joachim Murat's campaign against the Austrians until the defeat at Tolentino on May 2, 1815, after having received promotion to captain and the knight's cross of the Royal Order of the Two-Sicilies.

The Murattian and Sicilian officers, until recently on opposite fields, were to now live together in a condition of hostile rivalry which would tend to worsen following some divisive measures of the Bourbon government.

A turning point in the military policy of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies took place with the ascent to the throne of Ferdinand II who passionate about the military and with sympathy for the veterans of the Napoleonic campaigns excluded with the purge of 1821, who started the formation of a national army rescuing from the Murattian veterans and the Sicilian army cadres in which the ancient practice of the sale of degrees was still taking place.

In 1848 he was assigned to the 3rd Prince Regiment which was engaged in the repression of a revolt against the Bourbon regime in Calabria, receiving for his services the knight's cross of the Royal Order of Francis I.

In this phase of his life, Francesco Landi suffered from an unsteady health and difficulty in staying on horseback for a long time, preferring the carriage in operational movements, which was also the usual means for senior officers.

From the Revolt of the Gancia, there was a succession of actions by armed gangs, which, although not decisive, enjoyed popular support, especially from Cavour's Piedmontese agents and had the effect of keeping in constant pressure and a state of alarm the army, forcing it to long and exhausting marches and displacements to face the various threats.

Although the hypothesis of a landing in Sicily had been aired for some time, the authorities had not prepared a plan until May, limiting themselves to sending mobile columns of troops where armed bands were reported.

The War Council decided to give command of the operations to stop Garibaldi to Francesco Landi, preferring him to General Giovan Luca von Mechel as he was of Swiss origin and therefore deemed a foreigner.

A perplexed Landi sent a patrol expedition on May 15 to identify the enemy troops, preferring this solution to the continuation of the initial attack plan or the retreat towards Partinico.

The patrol columns were composed of several companies, including those of the 8th Hunters battalion under the command of Major Sforza, who would meet the Garibaldians and, after an initial phase of observation, would autonomously decide to attack around 10:00 in the morning, and this led to the Battle of Calatafimi.

Landi was heavily criticized of his conduct during the Battle of Calatafimi in which excessive prudence, the lack of coordination of the first attack, and an early retreat would determine an important impact on the morale of the troops, generating a chain of events that would lead to the fall of Palermo and an incredible military defeat.

[5] Part of the responsibilities, according to de Cesare in his account, were attributed to the contradictory orders of the various commands, afflicted by internal rivalries, to the delay in the arrival of reinforcements from Naples, to the untimely change of the lieutenant general on the same day of the Battle of Calatafimi.

Rivalry between Paolo Ruffo, Prince of Castelcicala with the lieutenant general Ferdinando Lanza, seventy-two years old at the time, and the well-founded fear of the presence in the surroundings of Calatafimi of insurgent formations that could support Garibaldi and seize Landi from behind.

These explanations were considered exhaustive by Lanza, as the latter confirmed Landi in command and uses him in positions of responsibility until the Siege of Palermo which started on May 27 with the arrival of Garibaldi at the gates of the city.

[7] To mitigate the sins of the regime, the Bourbon thesis was that the fall was due to the betrayal of the leaders, ancient Murattists, ungrateful for having been readmitted after the initial expulsion.