Thus, although the President could remove high-ranking members of the SEC, he could not govern and execute power to the board, thus providing a "dual layer" of protection.
"[2] Every accounting firm that audits public companies under the securities laws must register with the Board, pay it an annual fee, and comply with its rules and oversight, among other things.
"[5] He then effectively revived Myers v. United States as precedent[6] by citing it as an reaffirmation of "the principle that Article II confers on the President 'the general administrative control of those executing the laws.
The dissent opened with a general description of the clashing constitutional interests, matching the court's discussion of presidential duty in supervising the executive branch, with its own expansion on congress’ responsibility in creating government ‘offices’ in a manner befitting the times.
The dissent cited Humphrey’s Executor as precedent backing their assertion, and characterized it as a ‘partial overruling’ of the court’s cornerstone Myers.
The constitution, according to the dissent, was written in a broad manner in order to be read and applied in face of unforeseeable exigencies and necessary expansions of the federal government.
That should suggest that neither the president nor the legislator, the more expert branches in administrative knowledge, perceived the act to contain an insult to constitutional principles.
[21] With regards to the consequences of the ruling, the dissent warned that the scope of the decision is alarmingly wide, especially when taking into account the indefiniteness of the term “inferior officer”.
The dissent turned to listing some of the affected positions and overall found “no way to avoid sweeping hundreds, perhaps thousands of high level government officials within the scope of the Court’s holding, putting their job security and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk.”[22] Finally, the dissent criticized the court for simply assuming a ‘for-cause’ prerequisite for removing the Commissioner, and then building on that assumption to strike down a statute.