General der Nachrichtenaufklärung
[7] Gimmler was responsible for coordinating all the cryptographic security studies undertaken by German Armed Forces and was notable for standardising wireless phraseology between different Army Groups.
[11] Boetzel knew Hans Oster and Wilhelm Canaris and had fit the anti-nazi personality of Rudolf Roessler contacts, the man who had run the spy ring.
[11][14] The directors of the In 7/Vi cryptanalysis units from January 1941 to February 1945 were:[15] Oberstleutnant Werner Mettig was a career signals officer who joined the military in 1933, and worked up to command the Germany Armies cryptologic centre, Inspectorate 7/VI from November 1941 to June 1943.
After working in the Signals Battalion on the Eastern Front for several months, he was assigned second in command of OKW/Chi in December 1943, and subordinated to Hugo Kettler, and held the position until April 1945.
A central evaluation agency was created at the Zeppelin bunker near Zossen, which was designated as Control Station for Signal Intelligence (German: Leitstelle der Nachrichtenaufklärung) (abbr.
Considered a curious form of organisation, it enabled the cryptanalytic service to recruit sufficient staff without operational interference, at the same time maintaining close support of field units.
This combined unit was the logical result of the retreat of HLS Ost together with the German Army, from East Prussia to Zeppelin bunker near Zossen where In 7/VI and LNA were situated.
To cope with the situation, KONA 6 was moved from the eastern front to the western,[41] and a Senior Commander of the Signal Intelligence (German: Höherer Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung) (abbr.
All messages of an administrative or supply nature, nevertheless, helped to fill in the tactical picture, e.g. the strength of units being created on the training ground at Camp de Châlons at Mourmelon-le-Grand, was estimated by statistics of water bottles and blankets.
The English desk cryptanalysts, consisting of six personnel from the HLS, were put to work while located in Bad Godesberg, but in spite of a plentiful supply of intercepts, they failed to achieve any successes.
Under the leadership of War Administration Inspector (German: Kriegsverwaltungsinspektor) Dettman, and for a time under Professor Peter Novopashenny, this unit achieved considerable initial success until spring 1942.
[67] Despite the report to the cryptanalysis section, by a NCO who had escaped, that all cipher material had been destroyed, it had obviously proved possible for Britain to recognise, from other evidence, which British procedures had been read and which had not.
In discussing the achievements of the OKH/Chi, Lt. Col. Mettig, stated glibly: The Soviet 5-digit code was broken chiefly by War Administration Inspector (German: Kriegsverwaltungsinspektor) Lieutenant Alexis Dettman.
[95] When rating the relative importance of cryptographic including cryptanalysis achievements contributing to total intelligence, Mettig was most impressed by the continuous breaking of the Russian 5-digit code despite the difficulties that were experienced after spring-summer 1943.
It consisted of the communications between the Central NKVD Authority in Moscow and the commanders of those troops in Army Groups, directing staffs North and South, the less interesting GHQ Signals Regiments.
[210] The intelligence gained from breaking of traffic of SM 1 and the simple field codes allowed Germany, during the spring manoeuvres of Feb-March 1945, to build up a complete tactical picture of the Swedish Army in two months.
Although the messages were of insignificant value, a continuous check on officer personalities, deliveries of stores and information concerning airfields contributed to tactical knowledge of the Greek forces.
The unit consisted of six people, chief among whom were called Strobl, a cryptanalyst who solved a double transposition system of ELAS while Winkler concentrated on translating the traffic already readable.
The work became more important and the unit, now increased to 16 people, was attached to a Close Range Signal Intelligence Platoons NAZ G Winkler stated that in the beginning the Greeks sent their traffic in two figure substitution with alternative groups.
[234] The early research work of the Referat, carried out in close cooperation with the evaluation section of Fu III, was devoted to clarifying the use of Call signs, and to ascertaining systems of indicator groups and coding tables in different procedures.
Thus in the beginning of 1944, it was ascertained that two allied agents, who had been turned around by the Abwehr, were operating in a villa southeast of Bordeaux and were being handed clear messages for encipherment and transmission, without any supervision.
This was the only case in which Mettig is certain that it was possible for the Vauck section to solve an agent network by purely cryptanalytic means, and this was largely through breaches of security on the part of the Czech chief.
Contents of messages solved on this link were nearly always concerned with reports on the political situation and activities of the Czech Resistance Movement, and were so important that for a long time, the W/T traffic was allowed to continue unhindered.
By the end of March, the Vauck section had furnished Fenner's cryptanalysts, Peter Novopashenny, Trappe and Schmidt, with all the traffic in that system since September 1941 so that a start was made on a solution.
[239] This net received its name from First lieutenant Russian: Pyatidesyatnik) Harro Schulze-Boysen, whose house was the centre of a communist inspired espionage agency operating on a large scale.
[241] Mettig stated that he once saw a report concerning a German who transmitted, by wireless to England, details of a newly constructed signals shelter in Berlin urgently requesting that it be bombed.
This was fostered by such means as unification of signal regulations, a regular exchange of liaison officers, working personnel, equipment, reports, raw traffic and cryptanalytic methods, between the two agencies.
According to the minutes preserved among the papers of Erich Hüttenhain, Generalleutnant Wilhelm Gimmler, Chef AgWNV, stated that one special difficulty in signal communications was the fact that the diverse parts of the Armed Forces used different wireless and cipher phraseology.
[291][292] The first German Liaison officer to Finland was Hauptmann Johannes Marquart, who would later be Director of Referat Ia of Group IV of the GdNA and was later succeeded by Oberleutnant Riemerschmidt, stationed at Sortavala.
Results were exchanged every two or three days and NAA 11 varied its cryptographic priorities to give full attention to any special links required by the Finns, the request coming via Riemerschmidt.
