The Prussian General Staff also enjoyed greater freedom from political control than its contemporaries, and this autonomy was enshrined in law on the unification of Germany and the establishment of the German Empire in 1871.

Until the end of the German Empire, social and political convention often placed members of noble or royal households in command of its armies or corps but the actual responsibility for the planning and conduct of operations lay with the formation's staff officers.

"[3] After the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, King Frederick William III appointed Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prime Minister Baron vom und zum Stein and several promising young officers to his Military Reorganization Commission.

[7][2][6] In 1816, the reformer Karl von Grolman organised the Staff into Eastern (Russia), Southern (Austria), and Western (France and the other German states) Divisions.

Immediately upon his appointment, he established the Abteilung (section or department) which studied and promoted the development of railway networks within Prussia and incorporated them into its deployment plans.

He also formed telegraphic, and other scientific and technical departments within the General Staff[23] and a Historical division, which analysed past and current conflicts and published accounts of them and lessons learned.

[24] The Second Schleswig War (1864), the political origins of which lay in Denmark's conflict with Prussia and Austria over the Schleswig–Holstein question, vindicated Moltke's concepts of operations and led to an overhaul of the command arrangements of the Prussian Army.

Although there were inevitable mistakes and confusion on the battlefield, Moltke's pre-war calculations were proved correct, and the Austrian army was brought to battle at Königgrätz and destroyed.

Newly developed rifled artillery would no longer be placed in the rear of the order of march for employment behind the infantry; instead, a significant detachment would travel with the advanced guard of the leading corps or other major element, and the remainder would march with the front of the main body, providing immediate artillery coverage of the advanced guard on contact and of the main body during subsequent deployment on the field.

Finally, the introduction of the breech-loading infantry rifle marked a revolution in weapons effect, so that Moltke made the following analysis in 1865: The attack of a position is becoming notably more difficult than its defense.

[26]The government of Napoleon III was undoubtedly startled by the Prussian victory over Austria, and urgently sought to reform their army to face the conflict with Prussia which seemed inevitable and imminent.

[28][page needed] The result of the strategic preparation by Moltke (and diplomatic maneuvers by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck) was complete Prussian victory.

[30] Throughout his tenure, Moltke pushed for the Prussian army to engage in reassessment and self-improvement at every command level to maintain tactical superiority relative to other nations.

Bismarck's diplomatic skill had prevented any hostile European coalition forming against Germany, but the young Kaiser William II replaced him in 1890 and turned away from their friendly accommodation with Russia in favor of an alliance with Austria-Hungary.

Changing geopolitical factors around the turn of the century, including the establishment of vast European colonial empires and especially the rapprochement between the United Kingdom and France eventually led the German General Staff to reassess the wisdom of such a strategy.

Whereas Moltke and his immediate successor Alfred von Waldersee were confident in the ability of a relatively modest German garrison to defend the country's western frontier against the forces of Metropolitan France indefinitely, the General Staff under Alfred von Schlieffen determined that British neutrality in a future conflict could no longer be counted on, thus exposing Germany to the potential combined might of the British, French and their vast colonial empires in the west in case of any extended conflict.

One of the eight German Armies was commanded by Crown Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, paired with Konstantin Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, a senior general staff officer — the kaiser instructed his thirty-two-year-old son: "whatever he advises you must do".

[40] The system also removed uncertainty about the competence of Army Commanders Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria and Albrecht, Duke of Württemberg, though both were well-trained soldiers.

They led OHL in aggressively intervening in German political and economic life, changing the original goal of defending Germany's borders to conquest and expansion.

A consequence of wartime attrition was the premature deployment of Kriegsakademie students to army and corps general staffs, some of them before reaching their second year curriculum.

Using only weapons that had failed at Verdun, they devised a long, comprehensive list of measures to smash through enemy field fortifications, which were then taught to all ranks in the attacking units.

They were sure that a series of successful breakthroughs would snap their enemy's resolve, ignoring the fact that each victory sapped German strength, while their foes were continually strengthened by Americans flooding into France.

[44] The victors' fear was encapsulated by the clause in the Treaty of Versailles: "The Great German General Staff and all similar organisations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.

The War Academy (Kriegsakademie) was abolished, but training of General Staff officers continued, dispersed among the Wehrkreise (Military District) headquarters but overseen by tutors from the Truppenamt.

When Adolf Hitler became Reichskanzler in 1933, he instructed the Truppenamt/General Staff to ignore the Versailles restrictions; he would create a greatly expanded Wehrmacht, including the Army, the Navy, and a new Air Force.

[citation needed] Initially, the Army's leaders feared that their leading role as the defenders of Germany would be usurped by the unruly SA, the Nazi party's political militia.

While the need for a joint headquarters to coordinate the work of all the services was desirable in theory, for example to determine industrial and manpower priorities and avoid duplication of effort, OKW was increasingly used as an alternate Army planning staff by Hitler.

At the same time, OKW failed in its task of overseeing the overall war effort, resulting in wasteful diversion of resources to several competing and unregulated forces (such as the SS) responsible only to themselves or to Hitler alone.

[55] In November 1939, Halder, still fearing the war would end in disaster, discussed a coup with Army C-in-C von Brauchitsch and Carl Goerdeler of the Schwarze Kapelle, but finally decided Hitler was untouchable until Germany met a "setback".

[58] German students are admitted to the Army Academy after studying at a Federal Armed Forces University (Universität der Bundeswehr) in Hamburg or Munich, followed by several years of line duty.