The book was meant to be a Conservative challenge to the Lloyd George coalition and stressed for devolution of power from Westminster and the importance of reviving English industry and agriculture.
[14] During the war, he served on the staff of Sir Ian Hamilton at Gallipoli and landed with the ANZACs on the first day of that campaign; took part in a special British mission to Petrograd to improve Anglo-Russian liaison; visited Basra to update his study of commerce in the Persian Gulf; and, after a time in Cairo, with T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Bureau in Hejaz, the Negev and the Sinai Desert.
His province was one of the centres of Indian nationalist unrest to deal with which he insisted in 1921 on the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi, who was subsequently imprisoned for six years for sedition.
[13] Lloyd was very strongly opposed to Indian independence or even bringing a measure of democracy to the Raj and wrote of what he called "the fundamental unsuitability of modern western democratic methods of government to any Oriental people".
He negotiated the arrangements with Sir Winston Churchill and got the required permissions even when the Britain was broke from the First World War and struggling even to send its own teams to the Games.
A patron of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, he also established an annual grant dedicated to its efforts in producing a critical edition of the Hindu epic Mahabharata.
[21] He returned to Parliament again for Eastbourne in 1924 and served until 1925, when he was made Baron Lloyd, of Dolobran in the County of Montgomery, named after his Welsh ancestral home.
[23] From July 1937 onward, he was chairman of the British Council in which he oversaw an increase in lectureships and made cultural tours of neutral capitals to maintain sympathy for Britain's cause during the early months of the Second World War.
[24] The council was a purportedly-independent group meant to engage in cultural propaganda promoting the British way of life to the rest of the world that was in fact under the control of the Foreign Office.
[25] As head of the British Council, Lloyd ran his own private intelligence network that employed as one his spies the journalist Ian Colvin, who served as the Berlin correspondent of The News Chronicle.
[27] In November 1937, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden instructed Lloyd that the British Council was to concentrate especially on improving Britain's image in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland.
[31] In September, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Germany three times for summits with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Bad Godesberg and Munich to discuss the Sudetenland crisis.
[34] Lindsay regarded Dies as a particular problem as the congressman from Texas was known for his grandstanding style and his love of publicity, which led him to make fantastic and often-bizarre statements.
[34] Dies's investigation into British propaganda in America failed to find any, which caused him to turn his attention to Hollywood, where he alleged that too many filmmakers had left-wing and therefore "un-American" views.
Accepting that Czechoslovakia was a lost cause after the Munich Agreement, in the autumn of 1938, Lloyd focused on convincing the government that greater British involvement was needed with the remaining two members of the Little Entente: Yugoslavia and Romania.
[39] In the cabinet meetings, Lord Halifax used Lloyd's telegrams to argue that Britain should buy Romanian wheat and said that "how urgent the matter is, and of what importance it is without delay to try and do something in the economic sphere for Romania".
[40] Lloyd, the most consistent advocate of more British support for Romania, argued to Lord Halifax that it was too dangerous to let that oil-rich kingdom fall into the German sphere of influence.
[41] Working with a fellow member of the board of the Navy League, Lord Sempill, who had served as the deputy chairman of the London Chamber of Commence in 1931–1934, Lloyd sought from January 1939 onward to encourage British businesses to buy many products from the Balkans as possible.
[46] Lord Semphill had once been an enthusiast for Nazi Germany and had joined the Anglo-German Fellowship, but he was described as being "impressed by Lloyd's propaganda efforts and wanted to back them with specific business arrangements".
[49] Lloyd argued to Halifax that based upon his sources in Romania, Germany had indeed threatened an invasion, which the Romanians were denying for fear of enraging Hitler.
[42] Lloyd argued that Britain and France should co-ordinate their policies in the Balkans as the best way of deterring Germany and played a major role in ensuring the Anglo-French guarantees of Romania and Greece that were issued on 13 April 1939.
[50] Lloyd was regarded as such an important personality that he barged in as French Ambassador Charles Corbin was on the telephone with Prime Minister Edouard Daladier.
[50] Lloyd, who was fluent in French, talked to Daladier and told him that if France held firm in ensuring the guarantees to Romania and Greece, Britain would have to follow suit.
[50] Atherton wrote about Lloyd's actions in April 1939, "The beneficiary was Romania, who received a guarantee unconditional on a closer defensive alliance with Poland, and which helped her to balance between the western powers, Germany, and Russia.
[51] A recurring theme of Lloyd's letters to Halifax during the Phoney War was that the Treasury was not providing enough money for the British Council's work in the Balkans.
[58] Gafencu suggested a "machinery for common action", but negotiations broken down when King Carol learned that the British guarantee of Romania applied only against Germany, not the Soviet Union, as he wanted.
[59] In Belgrade and Sofia, Lloyd's visit was hampered by inability of Britain to supply weapons on the scale that both Prince Paul of Yugoslavia and King Boris III of Bulgaria wanted.
[58] Moreover, the unwillingness of Boris to renounce Bulgarian territorial claims over Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania rendered the idea of a neutralist Balkan league impractical.
[60] After finishing his Balkan tour, Lloyd went to Syria to see Maxime Weygand, whose Armée de la Syrie had been intended by the French General Staff before the war to go to Thessaloniki.
He believed the gift of a site for the mosque would serve as "a tribute to the loyalty of the Moslems of the [British] Empire and would have a good effect on Arab countries of the Middle East".