A 2005 Inspector General's report found that Tenet bears "ultimate responsibility" for the United States intelligence community's failure to develop a plan to control al-Qaeda in the lead-up to 9/11.

[2] Tenet has been criticized for personally authorizing the CIA's use of brutal and ineffective torture techniques during his tenure, in contravention of international law,[3][4][5][6][7][8][9] something which he has repeatedly denied.

[11][12] His father was from the ethnic Greek community of Himara, in Albania, and worked in a coal mine in France before arriving in the United States via Ellis Island, just before the Great Depression.

In 1999 the Director declined to reveal the overall budget for intelligence operations (including the CIA) which was a departure from his release the previous two years.

Tenet focused on potential problems such as "the transformation of Russia and China", "rogue states" like North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and terrorism.

In testimony before a congressional committee, Tenet later admitted the strike was the only one in the campaign organized and directed by his agency, though he still claimed it was not deliberate.

[28][29] Later analysis has suggested that a 100-yard (91 m) error in a military targeting database maintained by the Pentagon was not corrected or updated in a timely manner and that other systems intended to prevent such incidents failed to perform as expected.

As a result of this and other incidents, systematic changes were made to pre-strike Rules of Engagement (ROE) for U.S. pilots, including checklists verifying target information and coordinates.

China has never accepted the United States' version of events, although Tenet in a published work noted in a bit of black humor that in the prelude to the bombing of Iraq, China had, through unofficial channels, provided the Agency with the exact GPS coordinates of their Embassy in Baghdad so as to ensure the CIA knew the precise location.

[31][32] Tenet strongly opposed releasing convicted spy Jonathan Pollard, going so far as threatening to resign if then President Clinton pardoned him.

The 1998 bombings of two U.S. African embassies were the latest in a string of attacks on American interests in the west Indian Ocean region.

Once the Plan was finalized, the Agency created a "Qaeda cell" (whose functions overlapped those of the CTC's Bin Laden unit) to give operational leadership to the effort.

A series of flights in autumn 2000, overseen by CTC officials and flown by USAF drone pilots from a control room at the CIA's Langley headquarters, produced probable sightings of the al-Qaeda leader.

If the Cabinet wanted to empower the CIA to field a lethal drone, Tenet said, "they should do so with their eyes wide open, fully aware of the potential fallout if there were a controversial or mistaken strike".

[2] Tenet reacted to the publication of this report by calling it "flat wrong", citing in particular the planning efforts of the past two years.

Once in these countries these officers organized and led the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Kurds against Ansar Al-Islam and Saddam's forces in Iraq.

The rebuilding of this capability and the successful employment of these elite commandos is considered one of Tenet's greatest achievements in the Global War on Terror.

How could [an intelligence] community without a strategic plan tell the president of the United States just four days after 9/11 how to attack the Afghan sanctuary and operate against al-Qa'ida in ninety-two countries around the world?

[46] He proposed firstly to send CIA teams into Afghanistan to collect intelligence on, and mount covert operations against, al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Tenet refused to do a report on the military or occupation phase, but reluctantly agreed to do a NIE on the weapons of mass destruction.

The Senate report also found the US Intelligence Community to suffer from a "broken corporate culture and poor management" that resulted in a NIE which was completely wrong in almost every respect.

[62] Former DCI Stansfield Turner said, "I think the president feels he's in enough trouble that he's got to begin to cast some of the blame for the morass that we are in in Iraq on to somebody else and this was one subtle way to do it.

That led to speculation that the exit of both senior intelligence officials was related to the controversy over the September 11 attacks, alleged Iraqi WMDs, and the decision to go to war with Iraq.

[61] After Tenet left, John E. McLaughlin served as acting director[61] until Porter Goss was sworn to the position in on September 24, two days after the Senate approved him.

[65] Human Rights Watch and The New York Times Editorial board have called for the prosecution of Tenet "for conspiracy to torture as well as other crimes.

"[8][9] On December 14, 2004, President George W. Bush awarded Tenet the Presidential Medal of Freedom, along with Tommy Franks and Paul Bremer.

"[66] However, Bush's decision was met with some criticism: Democratic Senator Carl Levin said, "I don't think [he] served the president or the nation well."

Democratic Senator John Kerry said through spokesperson David Wade, "My hunch is that George Bush wasn't using the same standard when honoring Tenet and Bremer that was applied to previous honorees.

[72] Along with a number of other notable Greek Americans, he is a member of the advisory board of The Next Generation Initiative, a foundation aimed at teaching students public affairs skills.

The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies since 9/11 (2006) by Ron Suskind claims that Abu Zubaydah, once said to be al-Qaida chief of operations, was a low-level functionary and mentally ill.[74] In his memoirs, Tenet commented as follows:[75] A published report in 2006 contended that Abu Zubaydah was mentally unstable and that the administration had overstated his importance.