The task he took on was enormous, balancing regional demands, competition among his subordinates, morale among the rank and file, attempts by Congress to manage the army's affairs too closely, requests by state governors for support, and an endless need for resources with which to feed, clothe, equip, arm, and move the troops.

With the 1777 establishment of a more permanent army structure and the introduction of three-year enlistments, Washington built a reliable cohort of experienced troops, although hard currency and supplies of all types were difficult to come by.

Although Yorktown marked the end of significant hostilities in North America, the British still occupied New York and other cities, so Washington had to maintain the army in the face of a bankrupt Congress and troops that were at times mutinous over conditions and pay.

[12] On the other hand, his experience was limited to command of at most 1,000 men, and came only in remote frontier conditions that were far removed from the urban situations he faced during the Revolution at Boston, New York, Trenton and Philadelphia.

British arsenals were raided (including some in the West Indies) and some manufacturing was attempted; a barely adequate supply (about 2.5 million pounds) was obtained by the end of 1776, mostly from France.

Congress insisted that he defend it and recognizing the city's importance as a naval base and gateway to the Hudson River, Washington delegated the task of fortifying New York to Charles Lee in February 1776.

Major General Howe refused to act on a significant tactical advantage that could have resulted in the capture of the remaining Continental troops on Long Island, but he chose instead to besiege the fortified positions to which they had retreated.

In what some historians call one of his greatest military feats, he executed a nighttime withdrawal from Long Island across the East River to Manhattan to save those troops and materiel.

One detachment remained north of New York to protect the Hudson River corridor, while Washington retreated across New Jersey into Pennsylvania, chased by Major General Charles Cornwallis.

When Lee strayed too far from his army on December 12, his exposed position was betrayed by Loyalists, and a British company led by Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton surrounded the inn where he was staying and took him prisoner.

[90] Howe, who had already decided to campaign against Philadelphia, then withdrew from New Jersey, embarked much of his army on ships in late July, and sailed away, leaving Washington mystified as to his destination.

[91] Washington's difficulty in discerning Howe's motives was due to the presence of a British army moving south from Quebec toward Fort Ticonderoga under the command of General John Burgoyne.

Concerned that Howe was heading up the Hudson, he ordered three of his best officers northwards, Benedict Arnold,[95] Benjamin Lincoln, and Daniel Morgan and his corps of riflemen.

[112] While this was taking place Washington presided from a distance over the loss of control of the Delaware River to the British, and marched his army to its winter quarters at Valley Forge in December.

[113] Washington chose Valley Forge, over recommendations that he camp either closer or further from Philadelphia, because it was close enough to monitor British army movements, and protected rich farmlands to the west from the enemy's foraging expeditions.

Biographer Ron Chernow points out that Washington's handling of the episode demonstrated that he was "a consummate political infighter" who maintained his temper and dignity while his opponents schemed.

French entry into the war changed its dynamics, for the British were no longer sure of command of the seas and had to worry about an invasion of their home islands and other colonial territories across the globe.

[130][131] British and Indian forces organized and supported by Sir Frederick Haldimand in Quebec began to raid frontier settlements in 1778, and Savannah, Georgia, was captured late in the year.

[133] Despite known weaknesses in Quebec's provincial defenses, Washington was adamantly opposed to the idea, citing the lack of troops and supplies with which to conduct such an operation, the nation's fragile financial state, and French imperial ambitions to recover the territory.

Clinton engaged in a number of amphibious raids against coastal communities from Connecticut to Chesapeake Bay, and probed at Washington's defenses in the Hudson River valley.

New York Harbor froze over, and the winter camps of the Continental Army were deluged with snow, resulting in hardships exceeding those experienced at Valley Forge.

[141] The war was declining in popularity, and the inflationary issuance of paper currency by Congress and the states alike harmed the economy, and the ability to provision the army.

General Clinton withdrew the British garrison from Newport, and marshaled a force of more than 10,000 men that in the first half of 1780 successfully besieged Charleston, South Carolina.

[162] In the early months of 1781 the French foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes, realized that the war, now being conducted on a global stage, could not last much longer without decisive action in North America.

After the defeat of Gates at Camden, he had nominally gained control over South Carolina, although there was significant militia skirmishing, led by partisan fighters like Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter.

[170] Joining with the army of Phillips, he maneuvered against the growing Continental presence led by Lafayette, while continuing to raid and destroy economic and military targets in the state.

After a series of confusing and sometimes contradictory suggestions, Clinton in late July issued firm orders to Cornwallis to establish a fortified deep-water port in Virginia.

[190] Despite the onset of peace negotiations in the second half of 1782, Washington remained vigilant, treating with suspicion assertions on the part of General Clinton's replacement, Sir Guy Carleton, that he had suspended "all hostilities".

He has been characterized, according to historian Edward G. Lengel, in many different ways: "charismatic hero, master of guerrilla warfare, incompetent or infallible battlefield commander, strategic genius, nationalist visionary, fanatical micromanager, and lucky dog".

[205] The latter document was written at his final wartime headquarters, a house on the outskirts of Princeton owned by the widow Berrien (later to be called Rockingham), but was sent to be read to the assembled troops at West Point on November 2.