[2] Bonnet often recounted the story of a poilu, named Lauteau, a happily married man with two children, who was killed while displaying a reckless disregard for his own life while he was repairing a telephone wire that had been severed by German artillery.
[24] The American historian Ernest R. May wrote: "Small and dapper with a pointed long nose and a prominent Adam's apple, Georges Bonnett was privately mocked behind his back for overdoing the bidding of his young, sensual and well-to-do wife, Odette Pelletan....
[30] Bonnet was extremely critical of what he regarded as the "warmongers" of the Quai d'Orsay, and from the very beginning of his time as Foreign Minister, he tended to exclude his senior officials from the decision-making progress and preferred instead to concentrate authority in his own hands.
[41] As Halifax reported to the British Cabinet, Bonnet "wanted His Majesty's Government to put as much pressure as possible on Dr. Beneš to reach a settlement with the Sudeten-Deutsch in order to save France from the cruel dilemma between dishonouring her agreement [the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924] or becoming involved in war".
[45] On 31 May, Bonnet refused a British request for an Anglo-French démarche to Beneš demanding concessions to the Sudeten German Heimfront, but he promised to commit the French Minister in Prague, Victor de Lacroix, to do more to pressure the Czechoslovaks.
[48] Throughout the spring and the early summer of 1938, Bonnet refused to apply pressure on Czechoslovakia through official channels and instead used unofficial emissaries to carry the message that France might not go to war in the event of a German invasion, which led Prague to place more assurance on French statements of public support that was warranted.
[50] Not until 17 July 1938 would Bonnet issue a set of instructions to Lacroix, which explicitly warned Beneš and Czechoslovak Prime Minister Milan Hodža that because of the attitude of the British, France could not risk a war in 1938, and Prague should do its utmost to reach a settlement with Germany.
[57] In early September 1938, as part of his effort to prevent war by a mixture of threat and conciliation, Bonnet had a series of meetings with Welczeck and told him that France would honour the terms of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty if the Germans invaded Czechoslovakia but insisted that his government was quite open to a compromise solution.
[63] When it appeared quite likely in mid-September 1938 that war could break out at any moment in Central Europe after Hitler's violent speech blasting Czechoslovakia on 12 September and a failed revolt in the Sudetenland, Bonnet become quite frantic in his efforts to save the peace.
[65] During the same conversation, Bonnet "expressed great indignation with the Czechs who, it seems, mean to mobilise without consulting the French... he has therefore given a broad hint to Beneš that France may have to reconsider her obligations" and that "we are not ready for war and we must therefore make the most far-reaching concessions to the Sudetens and to Germany".
In fact, France in this case would have to stand alone on land the force of the combined German and Italian armies, without counting Japan, which in the Far East, will doubtless attack Indo-China.... For five months, night and day, in the course of our confident collaboration, we have struggled for peace.
[84] On the same day that Massigli was exiled, Pierre Comert, the Director of the Quai d'Orsay's Press Service, whose news releases during the Czechoslovak crisis were not in accord with the line that Bonnet wanted to hear, was sent off to the American department.
[95] The last statement was a reference to the practice of the Reich government of asset-stripping German Jews of almost everything that they owned as the condition for leaving Germany, which led Bonnet to comment that it "would greatly facilitate matters" if Jewish refugees ceased to arrive in France penniless.
As he noted during talks in October with a group of Deputies that had formally asked the Foreign Minister to end French commitments in Eastern Europe, "If I was free, I would carry out your policy; but I am not: I would have against me the majority of the Cabinet, led by Reynaud and Mandel, and I cannot count on Daladier, for Gamelin believes that in the event of war Polish military assistance would be indispensable".
[106] On 30 November 1938, there were what were very misleadingly described as "spontaneous" demonstrations in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, which had been organised by Benito Mussolini and his Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, who demanded that France cede Tunisia, Corsica, Nice, and French Somaliland (now Djibouti) to Italy.
[107] At the cue call, all of the fascist deputies rose up to scream abuse at France, which Ciano sought to explain away as merely an expression of the "spontaneous" rage felt by the Italian people over the French "occupation" of the lands that he insisted rightfully belonged to Italy.
[120] During the Franco-Turkish talks, Bonnet had first backed Puaux against any weakening of French control over the Sanjak of Alexandretta before he decided to settle the dispute in favour of the Turks as a way of potentially winning Turkish support in the event of a war with Germany.
[123] On 20 January 1939, Bonnet had a meeting with the former president of Mexico, Francisco León de la Barra, who was living in exile in Paris, and asked him to serve as an unofficial French diplomat in talks with the Spanish Nationalists.
[124] In response to reports from de la Barra that ties between General Francisco Franco and the Axis powers were strained, Bonnet then sent out Senator Léon Bérard to sound out the Nationalists about establishing diplomatic relations.
If a French foreign minister, against the storm and wave of opposition, substantiated our claims to the Sudeten German territory... and then drew his own conclusions privately from the changed situation in Central Europe, he could not be expected to withdraw all along the line when facing the Chamber.
[111] The Germans were then believed to have planned to overrun the Netherlands and to use Dutch airfields to launch a bombing campaign that would be meant to achieve a knockout blow against Britain and to raze British cities to the ground.
[115] In March 1939, after the German destruction of the rump state of Czecho-Slovakia and the proclamation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Bonnet had Hervé Alphand of the Ministry of Commerce, who was in Berlin to negotiate a trade treaty, recalled in protest.
[133] Welczeck reported that Bonnet had told him that he had no official opinion about the occupation, but his "personal view" was that "the peace and appeasement policy of the 'men of Munich' had suffered a lamentable disaster... in every country warmongers who would lead Europe toward catastrophe were bound to gain the upper hand".
[147] The report warned that in the event of the Danzig crisis turning into a war, the Japanese would probably seek to dominate the South China Sea as a prelude towards the invasions of French Indochina and British Malaya, both of which were well provided with rubber plantations.
[149] Bonnet's sought to block the signing of the Franco-Polish political accord as a way of applying pressure on the Poles to grant the Soviets transit rights, because if the negotiations for the "grand alliance" failed, he did not wish to see France any more committed to Poland's defence.
[162] As part of his effort to save the talks, Bonnet wrote up and presented to both London and Moscow the text of a joint communiqué, stating to the world their determination to resist aggression and that they "agreed on the main points of the political agreement".
[167] At the same time, immense French diplomatic pressure was applied in Warsaw for the Poles to agree to the transit rights for the Red Army, but Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck was very firm in refusing to consider such an idea.
[186] Later that day, Bonnet, during a phone conversation with Count Ciano, made a great point of insisting that the French démarche of 1 September was not an ultimatum, as he urged that the Italians start the peace conference as soon as possible.
[200] On 10 July 1940, Bonnet voted in favour of granting the cabinet presided by Marshal Philippe Pétain authority to draw up a new constitution, thereby effectively ending the French Third Republic and establishing Vichy France.
[204] Bonnet, throughout his career, had been very much concerned with his reputation, and during his time as Foreign Minister, he had a team of journalists to engage in what is known in France as Bonnetiste writing, a series of books and pamphlets meant to glorify him as the defender of the peace and Europe's savior.