German–Yugoslav Partisan negotiations
'March negotiations') were held between German commanders in the Independent State of Croatia and the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Partisans in March 1943 during World War II.
The negotiations – focused on obtaining a ceasefire and establishing a prisoner exchange – were conducted during the Axis Case White offensive.
The short-term advantage gained by the Partisans through the negotiations was lost when the Axis Case Black offensive was launched in mid-May 1943.
Prisoner exchanges, which had been occurring between the Germans and Partisans for some months prior, re-commenced in late 1943 and continued until the end of the war.
The objections centred on claims that Roberts was effectively equating the German–Partisan negotiations with the collaboration agreements concluded by various Chetnik leaders with the Italians and Germans during the war.
The captured group had been identifying new sources of metal and timber for the Germans, but Ott had also been tasked by the Abwehr with making contact with the Partisans.
[4] The second of these was negotiated by Stilinović and Vladimir Velebit, also a member of the Partisan Supreme Headquarters,[5] and Ott was involved on the German side.
Adolf Hitler and Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop were opposed to a modus vivendi, as they were afraid it would give the Partisans the status of a regular belligerent.
[6] Throughout that offensive, Partisan Supreme Headquarters engaged the Germans in negotiations to gain time to cross the Neretva River.
[4] The German historians Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat concluded that at this critical period, Tito was also concerned that by the end of the war the attrition to his Partisan forces would be such that Mihailović's Chetniks would be more powerful.
The German negotiators were led by the commander of the 717th Infantry Division Generalleutnant (Major General) Benignus Dippold, one of his staff officers and a Hitler Youth representative.
[4] In their written statement, the Partisans:[9] Popović returned to report to Tito, and the Wehrmacht Commander South-East Generaloberst (Senior General) Alexander Löhr approved an informal ceasefire while the talks continued.
[10] On 17 March, Kasche reported on the negotiations to the Reich Foreign Ministry, requesting approval to continue discussions, and asking for instructions.
[11] The following is an extract from Kasche's telegram:[12] Under circumstances possibility exists that Tito will demonstratively turn his back on Moscow and London who left him in the lurch.
In fact, the Tito Partisans are, in their masses, not Communists and in general have not committed extraordinary excesses in their battles and in the treatment of prisoners and the population.
[14] By this time, Đilas and Velebit had returned to Zagreb, where they reiterated that the Partisans wanted recognition as a regular belligerent, and emphasised the futility of continued fighting.
[11] Von Ribbentrop responded on 29 March, prohibiting all further contact with the Partisans and inquiring about what evidence Kasche had gathered to support his optimistic conclusions.
[17] Velebit remained in Zagreb to complete a further task: he successfully arranged the release of a detained Slovenian communist, Herta Haas, who was Tito's wife and the mother of his two-year-old son, Aleksandar.
[18] Mihailović was the first to receive reports of contact between the Germans and Partisans, and passed them on to his British Special Operations Executive liaison officer, Colonel Bill Bailey.
Ilija Jukić obtained evidence from German Foreign Ministry sources, which he included in his 1965 book Pogledi na prošlost, sadašnjost i budućnost hrvatskog naroda (Views on the Past, Present and Future of the Croatian Nation), published in London.
[20] In 1978, Tito admitted that the negotiations occurred, but characterised their purpose as "solely to obtain German recognition of belligerent status for the Partisans".
