[18] James J. Schneider has argued that from 1929, Joseph Stalin set out to create a "warfare state" in the Soviet Union, as a country that was continuously preparing to fight a large-scale war.

I still don’t understand how this could have happened: the Bolsheviks met us almost at the border "- that's what says chief of staff of the German air fleet at the Soviet military novel "The First Strike (The Tale of a Future War)".

A book written in the spirit of Stalinist slogans “The Red Army will respond with a triple blow to the blow of the warmongers” or “The Red Army will wage the war offensively with the goal of destroying the enemy and achieving victory with little bloodshed,” contributed to the emergence of boastfulness, arrogance, and clearly overestimated the capabilities of Soviet aviation".

The USSR had to purchase from Western countries, especially the USA and master the release of some licensed components and aviation materials.

Bureaucracy, inertia, the desire primarily for quantitative indicators seriously harmed the strengthening of the air power of the Soviet Union.

[23] At a meeting of senior command staff dedicated to the use of branches of the Armed Forces in the upcoming war, which took place six months before the Nazi invasion, where sometimes the most contradictory opinions were expressed.

The speakers presented different, sometimes directly opposing views on the optimal structure of the Air Force, the degree of centralization of control, the effectiveness of raids on enemy airfields, etc.

The Luftwaffe's Chief of the General Staff, Hans Jeschonnek, wanted to begin air attacks before the German artillery started firing.

However, Hitler and the OKW decided that that might give the opportunity for the Soviets to disperse their air units, and rejected Jeschonnek's proposal.

Messerschmitt Bf 110s of SKG 210 destroyed 50 aircraft at Kobryn airfield, near the headquarters of the 10th Mixed Aviation Division and the Soviet Fourth Army.

[29] Only 10 hours after the first Axis attacks, at 13:40, did the commander of the Red Army Air Force (VVS KA - Russian: ВВС КА - Военно-воздушные силы Красной Армии), Pavel Zhigarev, order the long-range aviation into action.

[32] Only the VVS Odessa, under the command of Fyodor Michugin [ru], was prepared for the assault, losing only 23 aircraft on six airbases to Emanoil Ionescu's Romanian Air Corps.

The low German opinion of Soviet combat capabilities had been confirmed, and was bolstered by information provided by captured VVS personnel.

The Soviet bomber fleet had been crippled; its remaining forces continued costly attacks on the German rear.

[39] In the latter case, nine German Messerschmitt Bf 109s managed to deceive the vigilance of air target detection posts, sneaking up at an extremely low altitude, and burned 21 I-16s and 5 I-153s in a 40-minute attack.

[40] The tactics of German aviation consisted of alternating raids on airfields by fighters and bombers in small and medium groups, depending on Soviet opposition.

And since many airfields did not have any air defense systems at all, and others had one or two anti-aircraft machine guns, there were no basic shelters for flight and technical personnel, the planes were crowded everywhere and were not camouflaged, the Luftwaffe acted very effectively and almost with impunity.

Many air regiment commanders assigned their subordinates tasks to conduct combat operations without coordination with higher headquarters.

But failure awaited them too, since it turned out that the Luftwaffe was well aware of the location of Soviet alternate airfields, as well as field sites near the border.

[43] According to the well-known authors of several dozen books[44][45] about the air war on the Eastern Front: "For Russian and German pilots the most terrible fate was to be captured.

When a plane was shot down over the UK, the Luftwaffe crew were doomed to stay in a POW camp until the end of the war, but they were sure that they would survive.

Red propaganda sought to inspire in soldiers ‘devotion to the Motherland’, and getting captured was considered shameful and a betrayal.

Often German aircrew who had bailed out or made an emergency landing were immediately killed by local residents or angry Red Army soldiers.

[47] Independent analysis by Western (but non-German) researchers demonstrates that the German aces were very accurate in estimating the number of destroyed Soviet aircraft.

[48] According to New Zealand military historian David Stahel: "In the opening days of Barbarossa the Luftwaffe inflicted carnage on the Soviet air force".

A detailed study of the vehicles captured by the Germans and published photographs showed that not all Soviet fighters, bombers, and attack aircraft were seriously damaged as a result of air raids.

The first day of aggression against the Soviet Union cost the lives of 133 aircrew members[62] According to the official German history of the Second World War: "The attacks in the early morning of 22 June were directed primarily against thirty-one airfields and against the supposed quarters of senior staffs, barracks, artillery positions, bunkers, and oil-storage facilities.

Initially Soviet fighters showed little desire to engage in combat and turned away at considerable range if fire was opened.

Оn the morning of 22 June the Soviets lost а total of 890 aircraft, 222 of them in aerial combat or to anti-aircraft fire and 668 on the ground.

Ву the end of the fighting in the frontier area on 12 July, the figures had risen to 6,857 Soviet aircraft destroyed against 550 total losses on the German side.