At its peak, Gideon Force had fifty officers, twenty British NCOs, 800 trained Sudanese troops and 800 part-trained Ethiopian regulars, a few mortars but no artillery and no air support, except for intermittent bombing sorties.

During the First Italo-Abyssinian War (1895–1896), the Royal Italian Army (Regio Esercito) had been defeated by the forces of Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia at the Battle of Adowa.

On 10 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France, making the AOI a threat to the British supply route along the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

[4] Wavell had about 86,000 troops at his disposal for Libya, Iraq, Syria, Iran and East Africa, whose frontiers were guarded by an average of about eight men to 1 mi (1.6 km).

Pressure was to be maintained everywhere to make the Italians exhaust their resources, a limited offensive in Sudan was to be conducted at Kassala and an advance was to be made on Kisimayu by January or February 1941.

Attempts would be made to encourage unrest among local civilians, particularly in Ethiopia, where Mission 101 had crossed the frontier on 12 August and the inclusion Ethiopian irregular forces was agreed upon at the conference.

In September, Colonel Daniel Sandford arrived to run the project but until the Italian declaration of war, the conspiracy was held back by the policy of appeasement.

Sandford requested that supply routes be established before the rains ended, to the area north of Lake Tana and that Selassie should return in October, as a catalyst for the uprising.

Gaining control of Gojjam required the Italian garrisons to be isolated along the main road from Bahrdar Giorgis south of Lake Tana, to Dangila, Debre Marqos and Addis Ababa, to prevent them concentrating against the Arbegnoch.

On 20 November, Wingate was flown to Sakhala to meet Sandford and the RAF managed to bomb Dangila, drop propaganda leaflets and supply Mission 101, which raised Ethiopian morale, having suffered much from Italian air power since the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.

Mission 101 managed to persuade the Arbegnogh north of Lake Tana to spring several ambushes on the Metemma–Gondar road and the Italian garrison at Wolkait was withdrawn in February 1941.

By January 1941, the Frontier Battalion had made two routes to Belaya and delivered stores but Sandford had failed to provide the mules, thought essential for climbing the escarpment if camels proved unsuitable.

Wingate was ordered to capture Dangila and Bure, which had garrisons of a colonial brigade each and gain control of the road to Bahrdar Giorgis, to provide a base for Selassie.

Selassie and Gideon Force rallied Arbegnoch, using loudspeakers to announce the presence of the emperor and induce local notables and Italian Askari to desert.

The most westerly Italian positions were now at the Debre Marqos forts, which Wingate besieged with the Frontier Battalion and moved the rest of Gideon Force towards the Blue Nile.

[15] Ras Hailu, with several thousand followers appeared, joining the Italians at Debre Marqos, by when Nasi realised that the size of Gideon Force had been exaggerated.

[15] Wingate arranged for Lij Belay Zeleke to block a route of retreat from Debre Marqos over the Blue Nile, assisted by Bimbashi Wilfred Thesiger and Captain Foley, with a platoon of the Ethiopian Battalion.

[17] Gideon Force received new orders to cut roads over a wide area to stop the Italians at Amba Alagi, Gondar, Dessie (and Jimma to the south-west) from uniting.

Part of the Frontier Battalion remained to watch over Ras Hailu and then went with Selassie to Addis Ababa, joining the 1st South African Brigade advance to Asmara.

[20] Wingate wrote a report on 18 June, to Wavell, in which he outlined the successes of the campaign and his views on future actions of a similar type, To sum up it is proposed to assemble and employ a force of the highest fighting qualities capable of employment in widely separated columns...that it should be allocated an objective behind the enemy's lines, the gaining of which will decisively affect the campaign; and that to enable it to carry out its task it must be given a political doctrine consonant with our war aims.Wavell rebuked Wingate for the language of the report and undertook to look into the grievances but was sacked and posted to India soon after.