Gisda Cyf v Barratt [2010] UKSC 41 is a UK labour law case, concerning unfair dismissal governed by the Employment Rights Act 1996.

It is entirely reasonable that the time (already short) within which one should have the chance to make those decisions should not be further abbreviated by complications surrounding the receipt of the information that one has in fact been dismissed.

These considerations provide the essential rationale for not following the conventional contract law route in the approach to an interpretation of section 97.

The need for the protection and safeguarding of employees' rights provides the overarching backdrop to the proper construction of section 97.

For that reason we emphatically agree with the EAT's view in McMaster that the doctrine of constructive knowledge has no place in the debate as to whether a dismissal has been communicated.

We do not consider, therefore, that what has been described as the "general law of contract" should provide a preliminary guide to the proper interpretation of section 97 of the 1996 Act, much less that it should be determinative of that issue.

For these reasons we reject the thesis that cases such as London Transport Executive v Clarke, Kirklees Metropolitan Council v Radecki, Potter v RJ Temple plc and George v Luton Borough Council represent a general acceptance that statutory rights given to employees should be interpreted in a way that is compatible with common law contractual principles, if indeed they are as they have been represented to be.

The House of Lords refused to permit the supplanting of the legislative scheme by entertaining a second claim at common law.

The leading judgment of Lord Hoffmann recognised the deliberate move by Parliament away from the ordinary law of contract as governing employer/employee contractual relations.

In Redbridge London Borough Council v Fishman [1978] ICR 569, EAT, at 574 Phillips J described the difference between the contractual cause of action of wrongful dismissal and the statutory regime of unfair dismissal thus: "The jurisdiction based on paragraph 6 (8) of Schedule 1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 has not got much to do with contractual rights and duties.

The essential underpinning of the appellant's case, that conventional principles of contract law should come into play in the interpretation of section 97, must therefore be rejected.

The construction and application of that provision must be guided principally by the underlying purpose of the statute viz the protection of the employee's rights.

Viewed through that particular prism, it is not difficult to conclude that the well established rule that an employee is entitled either to be informed or at least to have the reasonable chance of finding out that he has been dismissed before time begins to run against him is firmly anchored to the overall objective of the legislation.

The fact that this rule has survived, indeed has been tacitly approved by, successive enactments merely reinforces the conclusion that it is consonant with the purpose of the various provisions relating to time limits.

There is no reason to suppose that the rule in its present form will provoke uncertainty as to its application nor is there evidence that this has been the position hitherto.

The inquiry as to whether an employee read a letter of dismissal within the three months prior to making the complaint or as to the reasons for failing to do so should in most cases be capable of being contained within a short compass.

In the case of a whistle blower, for instance, the opportunity to forestall a recriminatory dismissal or one designed to frustrate the intentions of the conscientious employee may be of vital consequence.

But this right would be severely attenuated, and in many cases wholly eliminated, if the appellant's interpretation of section 97 is accepted.