Władysław Gomułka was appointed First Secretary of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) marking the end of Stalinism in Poland.

The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the resulting Destalinization and the Khrushchev Thaw prompted debates about fundamental issues throughout the entire Eastern Bloc.

The widely publicised defection of high-ranking Polish secret police agent Józef Światło had embarrassed the PZPR internationally and resulted in the weakening of the Ministry of Public Security.

Designed to be a vast propaganda exercise and a meeting place for Eastern European communists and their comrades from Western Europe, Asia, Africa and South America, the event brought hundreds of thousands of Polish spectators to Warsaw for the five days to watch dancing, theatre and other attractions.

However, the real attractions for the Polish people were the foreigners, many of whom were from Western Europe and contrasted starkly with local Poles because they shared a similar culture but were much richer and more open.

[5] Khrushchev was highly critical of Stalin, denouncing both him personally and his rule, much to the shock of those in attendance and eventually the communist world as news of the speech had spread.

[6] Bierut's poor health caused him to be hospitalised and he remained in Moscow while the rest of the Polish delegation returned, creating a prime opportunity for the anti-Stalinists.

In Poland, in addition to criticism of the cult of personality, popular topics of debate centered on the right to steer a more independent course of "local, national socialism", instead of following the Soviet model in every detail.

[7] On 3 March, during a conference of PZPR activists in Warsaw, Stefan Staszewski and others severely criticized the contemporary party leadership, including the absent Bierut.

[8] In June, dissatisfaction with the status quo eventually led to a mass demonstration by factory workers at the Joseph Stalin Metal Industries in the city of Poznań.

[5][9][8] They began a spontaneous strike when around 80% of the factory's workers had lost their bonus pay when the government suddenly raised the required work quota.

This grew into a wider protest against issues such as shortages of food and consumer goods, bad housing, the decline in real income, trade relations with the Soviet Union, and the poor management of the economy.

The Polish government responded with a harsh crackdown, branding the protestors as "provocateurs, counterrevolutionaries and imperialist agents," and the demonstration soon turned into a violent riot.

Street activity peaked during and immediately after the 19–21 October "VIII Plenum" meeting of the Central Committee of the PZPR but continued until late in the year.

Gomułka had been the General Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party (predecessor to the PZPR) since 1943, and had served as the de facto leader of Poland from 1947 until being ousted from power by the Stalinists in 1948.

[5] Gomułka proved to be acceptable to both factions of Polish communists: the reformers, who were arguing for liberalization of the system, and the hardliners, who realised that they needed to compromise.

One specific condition that he set was Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky, who had mobilized troops against the Poznań workers, be removed from the Politburo of the PZPR and Ministry of National Defence, to which Ochab agreed.

[15] A high-level delegation of the Central Committee of the CPSU flew to Poland in an attempt to block removing pro-Soviet members of Politburo of the PZPR, mainly Rokossovsky.

[16] The Soviet delegation was led by Khrushchev and included Anastas Mikoyan, Nikolai Bulganin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich and Ivan Konev.

However, in recognising the cries of the public, the Poles needed to keep the Soviets from direct control but could not raise their demands to a point that endangered their relationships in the bloc.

The enthusiastic public support offered to Gomułka contributed to the legitimisation of communist rule in Poland, which incorporated mass nationalist, anti-Soviet feelings into the prevailing power structures.

[9] Nonetheless, some social scientists, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Frank Gibney, refer to these changes as a revolution, one less dramatic than its Hungarian counterpart but one which may have had an even more profound impact on the Eastern Bloc.

[3] In China, some leaders viewed the events in Poland, together with the Hungarian protests, as demonstrating the danger of overemphasizing heavy industry while paying insufficient attention to people's livelihoods.

By mid-November, Gomułka had secured substantive gains in his negotiations with the Soviets: the cancellation of Poland's existing debts, new preferential trade terms, abandonment of the unpopular Soviet-imposed collectivization of Polish agriculture, and permission to liberalize policy towards the Roman Catholic Church.

[27] In the aftermath of the October events, Rokossovsky and many other Soviet "advisers" left Poland, signaling that Moscow was willing to grant Polish communists slightly more independence in exchange for allegiance.

[29] Gomułka's pledge to follow a "Polish road to socialism" more in harmony with national traditions and preferences caused many Poles to interpret the dramatic confrontation of 1956 as a sign that the end of the dictatorship was in sight.

[3] Gomułka gradually softened his opposition to Soviet pressures, and the late-1950s hopes for major political change in Poland were replaced with growing disillusionment by the 1960s.