Blunt and direct in manner, Saville had been an outspoken proponent of tactical aviation in the 1930s against a brotherhood of airmen who promoted strategic bombing.

Saville was a technical and scientific-minded leader who helped pioneer advanced mathematics for operations research, and computer systems for centralized coordination of air defense.

[3] While on reserve duty at Crissy Field in San Francisco, Saville watched Army Air Service pilots training on military aircraft.

In September of that year he was transferred to the advanced flying school at Kelly Field, Texas, from which he graduated on February 28, 1927,[3] gaining a commission as second lieutenant in the Air Reserve.

[1] He was assigned to the Fifth Observation Squadron at Mitchel Field, New York and in June 1927, he was appointed a second lieutenant in the Air Corps of the Regular Army.

[10] At ACTS, Saville joined Claire L. Chennault in favoring an air defense strategy hinging on a strong fighter force.

In July 1935, at the temporary rank of captain, he was named recorder of the Air Corps Board at Maxwell Field, in addition to his duties as fighter aviation instructor.

He assumed the role of assistant intelligence and operations officer of the Air Defense Command (ADC) at Mitchel Field in March 1940.

[1] Led by Brigadier General James E. Chaney, the ADC was tasked with testing various air defense measures to determine what worked.

[21] Before these plans were implemented, British radar pioneer Robert Watson-Watt surveyed West Coast defenses and found them "dangerously unsatisfactory", a confirmation of Saville's assessment.

Under Carl Andrew Spaatz, Saville argued against the plans for Operation Tidal Wave in August, the air attack on oil refineries in Ploieşti.

After the operation resulted in heavy American casualties with little effect on oil production, Saville described it as a "goddamned thing... ridiculous and suicidal.

In this, Saville was critical of the inaccuracy of high-altitude bombing; he wrote privately to a friend in April, "Our waste of effort in trying to hit railroad tracks and bridges is simply fantastic.

In light of the developing Cold War and the threat of Soviet long-range bombers, Fairchild determined that Saville's expertise was critically needed.

[29][31] Saville evaluated the ambitious Radar Fence Plan of Major General Francis L. Ankenbrandt, which had recently failed in Congress because it was too expensive in manpower and material, and would take too long to put in place.

Fairchild and Saville determined to devise a more practical radar defense plan, one that would bypass the slow approval methods previously established.

[32] In pushing his plan to fruition, Saville angered other officers who expected to have a say in air defense; he said, "I wasn't going to stand in line and wait.

In February 1949, Saville updated the House Armed Services Committee on the necessity of radar air defense, and in March the Lashup plan was approved by Congress.

Tests showed that the Northrop P-61 Black Widow, the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star and the North American F-82 Twin Mustang, then in service, were completely inadequate to stop high-altitude bomber attacks at night or in bad weather.

[37] Holloway and Saville agreed that America needed a fighter that could take off under "zero-zero" conditions of no visibility, and they felt that such a design should be in production by 1954, when the Soviets were expected to have fleets of bombers.

In September 1949, Arnold appointed Saville head of the newly established Directorate of Requirements in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at USAF headquarters.

Saville worked closely with Dr. Ruben F. Mettler of Hughes, to lay out the desired strategy of the weapons system and to describe the expected fighter tactics.

Designing an aircraft around a weapons system was something Saville had witnessed in the development of Bell's P-39 Airacobra around a large autocannon, but he further refined the concept and made it a requirement for government contractors, a practice that is continued to this day.

In his role as USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Saville helped direct missile work, but soon replaced himself on the GMIORG with Major General Robert M. Lee, commander of TAC.

Saville and Fairchild went to Congress in 1950, and obtained $114 million for the development of an electronic computer-based air defense system, a project headed by George E. Valley Jr., who was a physicist at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

[47] The computer, named Whirlwind, helped the USAF develop the Semi Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defense system.

[41] In the process, Saville had made enough enemies in the Air Staff that he realized Fairchild's absence would greatly limit his career advancement.

[49][50] In late 1950, USAF Chief Scientist Louis Ridenour initiated Project Charles at MIT to study problems of air defense.

[53] Saville was invited to join a November 1952 experimental commercial flight from Los Angeles to Copenhagen, flying to Denmark in a Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) DC-6B named Arild Viking, stopping first in Edmonton, Canada, then at the newly operational Thule Air Force Base in Greenland, which Saville had previously approved for major construction.

In this liaison role, Saville met regularly with military leaders to ensure that Ramo-Wooldridge projects answered America's defense needs.