The word was coined in 1887 to translate the concept of Subjekt in German philosophy (subject, meaning "the entity perceiving or acting upon an object or environment") into Japanese.

[16] Official statements by the North Korean government attribute the origin of Juche to Kim Il Sung's experiences in the Down-with-Imperialism Union during Korea's liberation struggle against Japan.

[21] Western scholars generally agree that Hwang Jang-yop, Kim Il Sung's top adviser on philosophy, was responsible for the conceptualization and early development of Juche.

[22] Hwang rediscovered the Juche speech sometime in the late 1950s, when Kim Il Sung, having established a cult of personality,[23] sought to develop his own version of Marxism–Leninism and solidify his position in the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).

[24][25] Hwang expanded upon the meaning of Juche and rewrote Korean communist history to make it appear as though Kim Il Sung had been the WPK's leader since its inception.

[30] The Central People's Committee [ja] promulgated regulations regarding its use in August,[31] and the calendar entered public usage on 9 September, the Day of the Foundation of the Republic.

[36] Kim Il Sung acknowledged that it was important for North Korea to learn from other socialist states, in particular the Soviet Union and China, but did not want to follow their examples dogmatically.

[54][55] North Korea received economic aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and China, but it did not join Comecon, the communist common market.

An excerpt from the opening speech says: Regardless of the opposition forces, the determination of the people and their strength and conviction are not measured by territorial dimensions, possession of advanced technology, still less, opulence or riches.

For those who wish to forget the lesson of history so easily and so quickly, Algeria, Vietnam, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola—and, closer to us, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Azania—are excellent examples which make them deeply reflect on.

military-first politics) was first mentioned on 7 April 1997 in Rodong Sinmun under the headline "There Is a Victory for Socialism in the Guns and Bombs of the People's Army" (인민군대의 총창우에 사회주의의 승리가 있다).

[79] A joint editorial entitled "Our Party's Military-First Politics Will Inevitably Achieve Victory and Will Never Be Defeated" (우리 당의 선군정치는 필승불패이다) was published by Kulloja and Rodong Sinmun (the WPK's theoretical magazine and newspaper, respectively) on 16 June 1999.

[84] Marxism–Leninism argues that the popular masses will lead (on the basis of their relation to production), but in North Korea the role of a correct leadership is required to organize a unified and effective group.

[85] South Korean political scientist Lee Kyo-duk argues that Suryong helped Kim Il Sung establish a unitary system over North Korea.

[89] Kimilsungism refers to the ideas of Kim Il Sung, while the Ten Principles serve as a guide for North Korean political and social life.

[94] Speaking after the Revolutions of 1989 that brought down the Eastern Bloc countries, Kim Jong Il explicitly stated that North Korea needed – and survived because of – Socialism of Our Style.

[94] He added that "if experience is considered absolute and accepted dogmatically it is impossible to build Socialism properly, as the times change and the specific situation of each country is different from another".

[94] Kim Jong Il went on to criticize "dogmatic application" of Marxism–Leninism, stating:[98] Marxism–Leninism presented a series of opinions on building of Socialism and Communism, but it confined itself to presupposition and hypothesis owing to the limitations of the conditions of their ages and practical experiences ...

[99] Socialism of Our Style was presented as an organic sociopolitical theory, using the language of Marxism–Leninism, saying:[100] The political and ideological might of the motive force of revolution is nothing but the power of single-hearted unity between the leader, the Party, and the masses.

[2][3] Korean political scientist Suh Dae-sook argues that Kim Il Sung did not explain the difference between socialist patriotism, which he said he supported, and nationalism, which he said he opposed.

[105] Shin believes that the key difference between Marxism–Leninism and Juche is that the latter places ideology above materialism; the vocabulary of family lineage and nationalism is retained and given primacy over class struggle, while social distinction and hierarchy are supported instead of a classless society and egalitarianism.

Myers argues that Juche cannot be described as a true political ideology because it does not have an underlying belief system,[106] while Alzo David-West calls it "meaningless on logical and naturalistic grounds".

[110] American historian Bruce Cumings and Professor of International Relations Christoph Hartmut Bluth similarly argue that Juche is not mere rhetoric, but rather an ideal of self-reliance that North Korea has attempted to implement.

[111] South Korean political commentator Park Sang-seek argues that Syrian Ba'athism in particular has rhetorical similarities to Juche, but the latter has a stronger ideological basis.

[115] The concept of a "sacred leader" in Juche as well as the cult around the Kim family has been compared to the State Shinto ideology of Imperial Japan, in which the Emperor was seen as a divine being.

[116] Through the fundamental belief in the essential role of the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung has become the "supreme deity for the people" and the Juche doctrine is reinforced in North Korea's constitution as the country's guiding principle.

[118] Juche's emphasis on the political and sacred role of the leader and the ensuing worship by the popular masses has been critiqued by various Western Marxists,[114] who argue that the North Korean proletariat has been stripped of its honor, and call the cult of personality non-Marxist and undemocratic.

[122] The festival's ritual components of collectivism serve to reinforce a "certain structure of sociality and affect", establishing Kim Il Sung as the "father" in both the body and psyche of the performers.

[123] Armstrong also argues that North Korea has transferred the "filial piety of nationalism in the family of the leader himself" by positioning Kim Il Sung as the universal patriarch.

[128] Kim Il Sung's consecration as the "Great Father" has been strengthened by the development of the North Korean family romance with the language, symbols, and rituals associated with familism.