Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999), commonly called Grupo Mexicano, was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court struck down—as beyond the equitable remedies authorized by Congress—a preliminary injunction used to freeze the assets of the defendants pending a final judgment.

[8] In 1994, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo (GMD), a company involved in the construction of public works in Mexico and Latin America, took out loans of $250 million from institutional investors.

It failed to make required interest payments on the loan agreement and reported a net worth of negative $214 million.

Alliance also sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting GMD from assigning some of its assets (called the "toll road notes") to other creditors until there was a final judgment in the case.

[16] The district judge, John S. Martin Jr., granted the temporary restraining order on the same day that the case was filed.

[17] On December 23, after a pair of hearings,[18] Judge Martin granted a preliminary injunction, finding that Alliance "would almost certainly succeed on their breach of contract claims against GMD" and that "without the injunction they faced an irreparable injury since GMD's financial condition and dissipation of assets would frustrate any judgment recovered".

[18] On April 17, 1998, Judge Martin granted summary judgment in favor of Alliance, awarding $82.5 million in damages.

[23] The United States argued that the appealed preliminary injunction was analogous to the traditional equitable remedy of a creditor's bill.

[27] In part III,[d] the majority concluded that the district court did not have authority to issue the challenged preliminary injunction.

[1] The majority rejected the argument of the United States government in its amicus brief that the injunction was analogous to the equitable action for a creditor's bill, since that was generally only available after a final judgment.

[28]In part IV,[e] the majority noted some policy arguments for and against Mareva injunctions[26] but declined to take a side, saying that it should be left to Congress to consider.

In closing, the majority quoted an excerpt from Justice Joseph Story's treatise on equity, which in turn quoted the famous[29] criticism of equity by the English jurist John Selden: "If, indeed, a Court of Equity in England did possess the unbounded jurisdiction, which has been thus generally ascribed to it, of correcting, controlling, moderating, and even superceding the law, and of enforcing all the rights, as well as charities, arising from natural law and justice, and of freeing itself from all regard to former rules and precedents, it would be the most gigantic in its sway, and the most formidable instrument of arbitrary power, that could well be devised.

[...] A Court of Chancery might then well deserve the spirited rebuke of Seldon; 'For law we have a measure, and know what to trust to—Equity is according to the conscience of him, that is Chancellor; and as that is larger, or narrower, so is Equity.

[33] Ginsburg was concerned that the majority's tradition-based test in Grupo Mexicano would cut back at constitutional remedies as expanded in the 20th century.

[41] Lower courts such as the First and Ninth Circuit have read the holding in Grupo Mexicano narrowly to avoid broader implications in for remedies in other areas.