Early in her career, Pirie operated as an escort in the South West Pacific Area, and in April 1943, was damaged off Oro Bay by Japanese aircraft.

Tensions between the corvette's commanding officer and the rest of the ship's company, excaberated by the lack of leave, mail, and pay, boiled over during the repair period, and led to a strike-like mutiny by the junior sailors shortly after Pirie returned to service.

In 1938, the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board (ACNB) identified the need for a general purpose 'local defence vessel' capable of both anti-submarine and mine-warfare duties, while easy to construct and operate.

[6] The need for locally built 'all-rounder' vessels at the start of World War II saw the "Australian Minesweepers" (designated as such to hide their anti-submarine capability, but popularly referred to as "corvettes") approved in September 1939, with 60 constructed during the course of the war: 36 ordered by the RAN, 20 (including Pirie) ordered by the British Admiralty but manned and commissioned as RAN vessels, and four for the Royal Indian Navy.

[14] Three United States Army personnel aboard Pirie at the time (a chaplain and two officers) offered to bury the dead at sea.

[16] Mills also treated both sailors and subordinate officers with contempt: as the only member of the Permanent Navy (as opposed to the Reserve or 'Hostilities Only' recruits), he considered himself superior to all else aboard.

[15] A small number of sailors were allowed home on leave, but Mills ordered the rest to remain aboard the corvette while the foredeck was stripped off and replaced, which made living conditions in the already poor messdecks much worse: those aboard were exposed to the noise of repair work, tropical heat, and ankle-deep water in the living areas.

[23] Older sailors and anyone above the rank of able seaman were not allowed to participate, so the corvette could deploy immediately if necessary and to ensure there were no repercussions for those who had families to support and might wish to continue their naval career after the war.

[24] Mills, who had received the list, informed those assembled how disappointed he was in the actions of the ship's company, then went ashore to meet with the Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC).

[25] Although attending the midday meal, the 45 sailors did not report for afternoon duties, and it was not until 1720, with the NOIC aboard, that they obeyed an order to fall in with the rest of the ship's company on the aft quarterdeck.

[26] On arrival at Cid Harbour early on 10 June, Mills was informed that a Board of Inquiry, consisting of senior officers from HMA Ships Australia and Hobart would be convened at 1100.

[27] On 15 June, Mills summarily charged twelve men with joining a mutinous assembly (including one who had not participated), and two others with disobeying instructions to persuade the others to return to duty.

[28] This was despite the Articles of War prohibiting charges of mutiny being laid without a court martial, and no opportunity to defend themselves or request clemency was offered.

[27] The sailors claimed that the decision to disobey orders had come from a consensus of frustration, and later theorised that those punished had either witnessed the commander's actions during the air attack, or were the ones most likely to speak up for themselves against Mills.

[28] The evidence collected by the Inquiry led the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board to conclude that Mills had failed to respond quickly and appropriately to the sailors' actions, and he was transferred to the training base HMAS Cerberus in December.

[30] During his final months in command, Mills attempted to reassert his authority through the use of increasingly frequent disciplinary punishments for minor breaches, such as failing to properly lash hammocks, or washing clothes in the wrong place.

[1] She remained in Tokyo Bay until mid-September and was present on Victory over Japan Day (2 September 1945), when the Japanese Instrument of Surrender was signed.