The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Waley v. Johnson (1942)[16] interpreted this authority broadly to allow the writ to be used to challenge convictions or sentences in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights where no other remedy was available.
§ 2241[17] to issue writs of habeas corpus to release prisoners held by any government entity within the country from custody, subject to certain limitations, if the prisoner – In the 1950s and 1960s, decisions by the Warren Court greatly expanded the use and scope of the federal writ largely due to the "constitutionalizing" of criminal procedure by applying the Bill of Rights, in part, to state courts using the incorporation doctrine.
Lincoln had received word that anti-war Maryland officials intended to destroy the railroad tracks between Annapolis and Philadelphia, which was a vital supply line for the army preparing to fight the South.
Indeed, soon after, the Maryland legislature would simultaneously vote to stay in the Union and to close these rail lines, in an apparent effort to prevent war between its northern and southern neighbors.
[31] The Senate amended the bill,[32] and the compromise reported out of the conference committee altered it to remove the indemnity and to suspend habeas corpus on Congress's own authority.
[34] Lincoln exercised his powers under it in September, suspending habeas corpus throughout the Union in any case involving prisoners of war, spies, traitors, or military personnel.
The Supreme Court did not address the substance of Vallandigham's appeal, instead denying that it possessed the jurisdiction to review the proceedings of military tribunals without explicit congressional authorization.
[39] Shortly after his inauguration as president of the Confederacy,[40] an act of the Confederate Congress of February 27, 1862, was passed authorizing Davis to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law "in such towns, cities, and military districts as shall, in his judgment, be in such danger of attack by the enemy".
[41] In various proclamations and orders beginning in 1862, Davis suspended the writ and declared martial law in parts of Virginia (including the Confederate capital of Richmond, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Petersburg, and elsewhere).
[43][45] Although Davis had initially been resistant to the idea, he suspended the writ after receiving a telegram from General Theophilus Holmes complaining that his region was filled with disloyal persons and deserters, and that he could not enforce conscription.
[46] General John Bankhead Magruder illegally attempted to invoke the act in April 1864 against three individuals who had published an anti-war broadside in the fall of 1863.
[41] Citing "discontent, disaffection, and disloyalty",[40] Davis made entreaties in late 1864 and 1865 about the necessity of suspension, but bills to further suspend habeas corpus failed in the Confederate Senate.
One of these, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, permitted the president to suspend habeas corpus if conspiracies against federal authority were so violent that they could not be checked by ordinary means.
That same year, President Ulysses S. Grant suspended the writ of habeas corpus in nine South Carolina counties;[47] the Act's sunset clause ended that suspension with the close of the next regular session of Congress.
Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the governor of Hawaii Territory, Joseph Poindexter, at the specific request by Lieutenant General Walter Short, US Army, invoked the Hawaiian Organic Act, 31 Stat.
Short was recalled to Washington, D.C. two weeks after the attack and subsequently Hawaii was governed by US Army Lieutenant Generals Delos Emmons and Robert C. Richardson Jr. for the remainder of the war.
In Ex parte Quirin (1942),[50] the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the writ of habeas corpus did not apply, and that the military tribunal had jurisdiction to try the saboteurs, due to their status as unlawful combatants.
In 1996, following the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed (91–8 in the Senate, 293–133 in the House) and President Clinton signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
The Act limits the power of federal judges to grant relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim has resulted in a decision that It barred second or successive petitions generally but with several exceptions.
Petitioners who had already filed a federal habeas petition were required first to secure authorization from the appropriate United States Court of Appeals, to ensure that such an exception was at least facially made out.
The November 23, 2001 Presidential Military Order purported to give the President of the United States the power to detain non-citizens suspected of connection to terrorists or terrorism as enemy combatants.
Congress had previously passed the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006 which stated in Section 1005(e), "Procedures for Status Review of Detainees Outside the United States": (1) Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(2)The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on any claims with respect to an alien under this paragraph shall be limited to the consideration of whether the status determination ... was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including the requirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence), and to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.On September 29, the U.S. House and Senate approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006, a bill which suspended habeas corpus for any alien determined to be an "unlawful enemy combatant engaged in hostilities or having supported hostilities against the United States"[55][56] by a vote of 65–34.
In January 2007, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told the Senate Judiciary Committee that in his opinion: "There is no express grant of habeas in the Constitution.
[59] Robert Parry wrote in the Baltimore Chronicle & Sentinel: Applying Gonzales's reasoning, one could argue that the First Amendment doesn't explicitly say Americans have the right to worship as they choose, speak as they wish or assemble peacefully.
[63] On June 11, 2007, a federal appeals court ruled that Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a legal resident of the United States, could not be detained indefinitely without charge.
In July 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that "if properly designated an enemy combatant pursuant to the legal authority of the President, such persons may be detained without charge or criminal proceedings for the duration of the relevant hostilities.
Following the December 1, 2011, vote by the United States Senate to reject an NDAA amendment proscribing the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens, the ACLU has argued that the legitimacy of Habeas Corpus is threatened: "The Senate voted 38-60 to reject an important amendment [that] would have removed harmful provisions authorizing the U.S. military to pick up and imprison without charge or trial civilians, including American citizens, anywhere in the world... We're disappointed that, despite robust opposition to the harmful detention legislation from virtually the entire national security leadership of the government, the Senate said 'no' to the Udall amendment and 'yes' to indefinite detention without charge or trial.
[69] On March 20, 2015, a New York Supreme Court justice issued an order to "show cause & writ of habeas corpus" in a proceeding on behalf of two chimpanzees used in research at Stony Brook University.
[71] This was built upon in 2023 when a 6-3 majority led by Clarence Thomas ruled in Jones v. Hendrix that a prisoner being convicted of an act which is not a crime, and thus being legally innocent, is not sufficient cause to file an appeal under habeas corpus.