Hallstein Doctrine
[1] Konrad Adenauer, who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1949 to 1963, explained the outlines of the policy in a statement to the German parliament on 22 September 1955.
[2]: 19 The Four Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971 and the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972 brought an end to the doctrine, in accordance with the new strategy of Ostpolitik.
Following Germany's defeat in World War II, the territory east of the Oder–Neisse line was under Soviet or Polish administration and had de facto been annexed.
[7]: 19 After the ratification of the Paris Accords on 5 May 1955, the General Treaty (Deutschlandvertrag), which largely restored (West) German sovereignty, took effect.
[8]: 41 The government of the Federal Republic of Germany claimed to speak for the whole German people; this was re-iterated in a number of declarations.
In 1955 Konrad Adenauer visited Moscow, where agreement was reached that the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union would establish diplomatic relations.
[11]: 84 Grewe himself writes that he devised the broad outlines of the policy, but mainly as one of a number of options, the decisions being made by the foreign minister, Brentano, and the chancellor, Adenauer; in any case, the name Hallstein doctrine may be something of a misnomer.
[7]: 23 Grewe warned privately that flexibility was essential and that it was not possible to pretend that the state-like entity of East Germany did not exist[7]: 23 and gave the diplomatic service guidance on what sort of activities would be tolerated under the policy.
[7]: 24 While Grewe was somewhat circumspect, the foreign minister, Brentano, made it clear that – regardless of the economic consequences – the Federal Republic would immediately break off diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic de jure or recognized the "reality of two German states".
The political arguments were: that recognition implied acceptance of the division of Germany; that non-recognition meant rejection of the status quo; that non-recognition gave moral support to the population of East Germany in rejecting the Communist regime; that non-recognition weakened the international standing of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union and increased the standing of the Federal Republic of Germany; and that recognition of the German Democratic Republic would not lead to reunification because the other side would not be expected to commit political suicide.
[7]: 32–33 In the 1960s, after the building of the Berlin Wall, Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader increasingly claimed to represent the whole of Germany.
This was not especially problematic, because the Federal Republic of Germany did not object to trade relations, providing it did not involve explicit diplomatic recognition.
This was regarded by the Federal Republic of Germany as equivalent to official diplomatic recognition and could be expected to be met with sanctions of some form.
Countries such as Egypt attempted to avoid upsetting either side by issuing an exequatur but adding a note that it did not imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic.
Right up to 1969, however, the German Democratic Republic was not able to achieve full diplomatic representation – with two possible exceptions: The doctrine was applied twice, to Yugoslavia in 1957, and to Cuba in 1963.
When, in 1957, the GDR opened an office in Cairo to establish contact with the entire Arab world, the Federal Republic did not withdraw its ambassador from Egypt.
The Four Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971 and the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972 brought an end to the doctrine, in accordance with the new strategy of Ostpolitik.
In the first years after the establishment of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the United States refused to have diplomatic contact with them.
[1] According to him, the doctrine's impact on the West and the East German foreign policy was only marginal, more myth than reality.
[13] During the entire Cold War, national economic and international geostrategic interests dominated German foreign affairs – on both sides of the wall.
