Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that military commissions set up by the Bush administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions ratified by the U.S.[1] Hamdan raises several legal issues: Whether the United States Congress may pass legislation preventing the Supreme Court from hearing the case of an accused combatant before his military commission takes place; whether the special military commissions established by the executive branch violated federal law (including the UCMJ and treaty obligations); and whether courts can enforce the articles of the Geneva Conventions.

[2][3] After hearing oral arguments on March 28, 2006, on June 29, 2006, the Court issued a 5–3 decision holding that it had jurisdiction; that the administration lacked either the constitutional power or congressional authorization to establish these particular military commissions; that, absent such authority, the military commissions had to comply with the "ordinary laws" of the U.S. and of war, which include the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions incorporated therein; and that Hamdan's trial, having violated the rights and procedures under both bodies of law, was illegal.

He was assigned a defense counsel, LCDR Charles D. Swift from the Navy JAG, who with a legal team filed a petition for Hamdan in US District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the military commission, and saying that it lacked the protections required under the Geneva Conventions and United States Uniform Code of Military Justice.

[9] Judge Randolph, who wrote the decision, cited the following reasons for the legality of the military commission: On November 7, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.

[11] Chief Justice Roberts recused himself because he had previously ruled on this case as part of the three judge panel on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Critics called for Justice Antonin Scalia to recuse himself, since he had made allegedly improper comments about the decision of the case prior to hearing oral arguments ("I'm not about to give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial.

The Stevens opinion began with the issue of jurisdiction, denying the U.S. government's motion to dismiss under Section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), which gave the D.C.

Even if he possessed such power, those tribunals would either have to be sanctioned by the "laws of war", as codified by Congress in Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or authorized by statute.

As to the laws of war, to the majority these necessarily include the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions, each of which require more protections than the military commission provides.

1, the question whether his potential status as a prisoner of war independently renders illegal his trial by military commission may be reserved.

[19] In Part One of Kennedy's concurrence, he raises his concern for the separation of powers; specifically, how one branch can control all the elements of a case, including avenues of review and appeal.

The negation of fairness safeguards renders the commission a judicial entity which is not a "regularly constituted court", as required in the Geneva Convention.

In sum, Kennedy writes that the commission exceeds congressional bounds, though the Congress is free to re-write the law as they see fit.

Kennedy writes that he feels it was not necessary to delve into the validity of the conspiracy charge, and he expresses no view on the merits of the other limitations of the commission noted in Part V of the Decision.

His first argument relies on the part of the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) (effective December 30, 2005) that states "[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."

Scalia's opinion is that this clause suffices to deny the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the case, calling the majority's reading of the effectiveness provisions of §1005(h), a "mess".

Furthermore, he anticipates that expanding the jurisdictions able to hear writs of habeas corpus from Guantanamo Bay would create excessive load on the court system.

In its second major argument, Scalia's opinion argues that petitioners such as Hamdan held outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States lack the right to the writ of habeas corpus.

Finally, Justice Scalia chastises the Court for taking equity jurisdiction of the case and draws an analogy with Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975).

[24] Citing his dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Thomas briefly reprised the roles granted by the Constitution to the three different branches in time of war.

He argued that under the framework established in Ex parte Quirin and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, President Bush's decision to try Hamdan before a military commission "is entitled to a heavy measure of deference", inasmuch as Congress had authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force to prevent future acts of terrorism when it passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force.

Under this view, the enactment by Congress of the AUMF did not mark the beginning of the conflict with al Qaeda, but rather authorized the Executive to use force to combat it.

Thomas asserted that the Court's duty in this instance to "defer to the President's understanding of the provision at issue" is made even more acute by the fact that he is acting pursuant to his authority as Commander-in-Chief.

Alito disagreed with Kennedy's assertion that "an acceptable degree of independence from the Executive is necessary to render a commission 'regularly constituted' by the standards of our Nation's system of justice", arguing that Kennedy "offers no support for this proposition (which in any event seems to be more about fairness or integrity than regularity)", and further arguing that the commission in Quirin was no different from the present case.

The impact of the decision on the petitioner, Hamdan, was that he can still be tried; however, his trial must be in a court, such as a military court-martial, or possibly a commission that has court-like protections.

[28] The passage and signing of the Act follows through on President Bush's expressed intention to get explicit Congressional authorization to use military tribunals.

[32] This may be the basis of a July 11, 2006, statement by the Bush administration that all detainees at Guantanamo Bay and in U.S. military custody everywhere are entitled to humane treatment under the Geneva Conventions.

[33] This declaration appears not to cover CIA detainees and is ambiguous with respect to the interpretation of Common Article 3 and the definition of "humane treatment".

[34] There were some indications that the other detainees being held at facilities throughout the world (e.g., Bagram Air Base and black sites), might use the Supreme Court's ruling to challenge their treatment.

In particular, it may undermine the Bush administration's legal arguments for domestic wiretapping by the National Security Agency without warrants as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.