[5] In 1928 he graduated from the Kriegsakademie (War Academy) first in his class and in April Jeschonnek worked for Inspectorate 1 (L), the aerial warfare branch of the Ministry of the Reichswehr (Reichswehrministerium) under the command of Hellmuth Felmy from 1929.

He showed a distinct lack of interest in these dull non-operational matters and, as a consequence, the chasm between the ambitions of the General Staff and Udet's production planners widened before the war started.

Jeschonnek had the intelligence to hold such a senior rank, but his lack of experience of higher command, in either peace or wartime, in an increasingly complex and large organisation, meant he could not control it.

[4] Jeschonnek's inferiority in age and rank undermined his authority when dealing with other forceful, ruthless staff officers and field commanders in the mold of Felmy, Albert Kesselring, Hugo Sperrle or Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen.

[29] Specifically, Plocher warned Jeschonnek on the need for a prompt build-up of reserves in both flying personnel and aircraft, insisting that only by a continuous flow of reinforcements through training and further production could the losses that were to be expected in case of war be made good to some extent, so that the operational strength of the units would not drop too quickly below an irreducible minimum.

Jeschonnek's support of Udet's idea to add dive-bombing capability to all conventional bomber aircraft delayed and retarded the development and production of promising level-bomber designs damaging the German war effort.

[37] Once Jeschonnek had adopted a concept of aerial warfare that made him an advocate of so-called blitzkrieg ideas, he may have given no further thought to a war against a large industrial power such as the Soviet Union and any requirement for a heavy bomber.

"[41] Richthofen, who served as chief of staff to Hugo Sperrle in the Condor Legion, had already solved many of these issues and his operations in Spain,[42] influenced the plans for the attack on Poland in 1939.

[43] In June 1939 during the General Staff Ride, Jeschonnek stated unequivocally that upon the declaration of hostilities the Luftwaffe should not direct all its power to destroying the enemy air force(s).

[46] Jeschonnek reneged on this point just prior to the outbreak of war, in which he stated that land support operations should only supplant the air superiority mission if they offered "the possibility of bringing about unconditional, immediate, and sensible results.

[60] In the intervening period Göring sought permission to attack docks and shipyards in Britain, but Hitler refused to allow the diversion of the air effort until Fall Gelb had begun and bases had been acquired in the Low Countries.

[61] Despite Jeschonnek's lack of cooperation in the war at sea, he was approached by Großadmiral Erich Raeder, commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine (Navy) to assist in planning the invasions of Denmark and Norway, Operation Weserübung.

"[71] Göring hoped that achieving victory in the air battle would avoid an invasion of Britain by persuading the Churchill Government to either submit to, or reach a peace settlement with, Germany.

[73] The same day Göring and his Luftflotten commanders met at Carinhall, but discussed only peripheral matters concerning the coming air offensive, named Operation Eagle Attack.

[73] While the army and navy made tentative steps toward planning an amphibious assault, the OKL was engaged in an internal debate about which target sets should be attacked to attain control of the air.

[76] Joseph Schmid, Jeschonnek's chief intelligence officer, was primarily responsible for providing inaccurate and distorted information to senior German air commanders encouraging enormous over-confidence.

[77] As the Battle of Britain progressed Jeschonnek, Göring and Kesselring came to believe the overly optimistic victory reports by German airmen and the false intelligence from Schmid suggesting RAF Fighter Command was on the verge of collapse.

Post-war analysis has disproven the myth that the German decision to attack London and abandon the offensive against airfields saved Fighter Command; British defences remained largely intact.

[92] Jeschonnek's solution to carrying out effective strategic bombing without a heavy bomber, (for which he was partially responsible), was to commit a select few of his highly trained air crew for surgical strikes on important industrial targets.

The decision to attack the largest nation in the world with an air force that quantitatively was the same size as it had been the previous year and that was weaker in crew experience and training, was to prove a grave error.

"[116] Jeschonnek maintained the Luftwaffe was an offensive weapon and though he sympathised with Adolf Galland, General der Jagdflieger, he continued to build assault units and develop ground-attack pilots at the expense of the Jadgwaffe.

[119] Jeschonnek quickly recognised his mistake when planning the technicalities of the air lift and urged Göring to warn Hitler the required tonnage could not be delivered, but his superior regarded it as too late and refused.

[123] In a belated effort to equalise the balance of power on the battlefield, Jeschonnek and his operations staff officer, Rudolf Meister, were the prime movers in attacks on industrial sectors[124] although the army may have taken the opportunity to pressure the OKL into bombing tank factories, prior to Citadel.

[129] Jeschonnek's admission was in contrast to his conversations with Robert Ritter von Greim's chief of staff, Fritz Kless, which discussed an effort to use 20–30 aircraft to carry out "terror attacks" aimed at breaking Soviet morale in cities behind the frontline.

[142] In 1939 RAF Bomber Command began bombing operations against German ports which set in motion one of the longest wartime campaigns for the Luftwaffe — known as the Defence of the Reich (Reichsverteidigung).

The German military attaché in Washington, D.C., General Friedrich von Boetticher, produced highly detailed reports on the B-17 Flying Fortress and American aircraft development.

Hitler and Göring were determined to regain the initiative and retain powerful air fleets at the fronts while increasing the size of night and day fighter forces in Germany.

[154] The shock effect of Hamburg on the OKL encouraged greater urgency in producing new tactics and technologies to overcome the British offensive, now the Germans had lost the lead in the battle of the beams.

[164] Historian Richard Suchenwirth wrote that after World War I there emerged two schools of officer; the cautious, who feared a conflict involving Germany would only bring a powerful coalition against them, and the optimists who believed the stab-in-the back legend, and the invincibility of German arms.

After his death, he was replaced by General der Flieger Günther Korten and, simultaneously, Oberst Eckhard Christian was moved to Luftwaffe-Führungstab (staff for the direction of air operations).