[1] By the time Seeckt left the German Army in 1926 the Reichswehr had a clear, standardized operational doctrine, as well as a precise theory on the future methods of combat which greatly influenced the military campaigns fought by the Wehrmacht during the first half of the Second World War.
[4] At the outbreak of the First World War, Seeckt held the rank of lieutenant colonel and served as chief of staff for Ewald von Lochow in the German III Corps.
This was a break from the established method of securing flanks by advancing along a uniform front, using reserve formations to assist in overcoming strong points.
The crumbling Ottoman Empire was enticed to join in the conflict with the promise that a victory would yield them the return of recently lost territories, while Germany hoped the involvement of the Turks would tie down forces of the Entente far from Western Europe.
Seeckt was appointed Chairman of the new Military Committee charged with reorganizing the German army in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Treaty.
For then neither officers nor the people will lapse into enfeebling illusions of peace, but will remain aware that in the moment of truth only personal and national stature counts.
In a letter to his wife, herself partially Jewish, on 19 May 1919, Seeckt wrote about the new Prussian Prime Minister, Paul Hirsch: He is not so bad and is an old parliamentarian.
After seeing encouraging signs from the newly established War Commissar's Office of Leon Trotsky, Seeckt sent out his close friend Enver Pasha on a secret mission to Moscow to make contacts with the Soviets.
[40] In the summer of 1920, Pasha sent Seeckt a letter from Moscow asking for German arms deliveries to the Soviet Union in exchange for which Trotsky promised to partition Poland with Germany.
Seeckt did not hesitate to use military force against attempts by German communists to take power, but his concern over communism did not affect his attitude toward relations with the Soviet Union.
[29] Seeckt regarded the efforts of General Rüdiger von der Goltz and his Freikorps to create an anti-communist, German-dominated state in the Baltic as a ludicrous attempt to turn back the clock.
In the East, German troops would invade Poland and attempt to establish contacts with the Soviet Union, after which they would both march against France and Britain.
[53] What came to be known as the Black Reichswehr" became infamous for its practice of using Feme murders to punish "traitors" who, for example, revealed the locations of weapons' stockpiles or names of members.
[55] In 1921, Seeckt had Kurt von Schleicher of Sondergruppe R negotiate the arrangements with Leonid Krasin for German aid to the Soviet arms industry.
[59] The arms contracts of GEFU in the Soviet Union ensured that Germany did not fall behind in military technology in the 1920s despite being disarmed by Versailles, and laid the covert foundations in the 1920s for the overt rearmament of the 1930s.
For carrying it out it is essential to assess one's own strength correctly and at the same time understand the methods and aims of the other powers.The man who bases his political ideas on the weakness of his own country, who sees only dangers, or whose only desire is to remain stationary, is not pursuing a policy at all, and should be kept far away from the scene of activity.The years 1814/15 saw France in complete military and political collapse, yet no one at the Congress of Vienna followed a more active policy than Talleyrand — to France's advantage.
It is beyond a doubt that such a double association would strengthen Germany-and also Russia … The whole policy of reconciliation and appeasement towards France — no matter whether it is pursued by a Stinnes or by General Ludendorff — is hopeless as it aims at political success.
British policy is ruled by other more compelling motives than anxiety about some far-distant threat from a Russia made strong with the help of Germany...With Poland we come now to the core of the Eastern problem.
The attainment of this objective must be one of the firmest guiding principles of German policy, as it is capable of achievement — but only through Russia or with her help.Poland can never offer Germany any advantage, either economically, because she is incapable of development, or politically, because she is a vassal state of France.
Germany will not be Bolshevized, even by an understanding with Russia on external matters.The German nation, with its Socialist majority, would be averse to a policy of action, which has to reckon with the possibility of war.
It is echoed by many bourgeois-pacifist elements, but among the workers, and also among the members of the official Social Democratic Party there are many who are not prepared to eat out of the hands of France and Poland.
Seeckt was aware that the purpose of the insurgencies was to overthrow the government that had accepted the terms of the Treaty and to start a war against France, but he reasoned the result would have led to the destruction of Germany's small forces and a French occupation of German territory.
[69] Seeckt was prompt in his response, ordering the Reichswehr to crush Buschrucker's putsch by laying siege to the forts he had seized outside of Berlin.
Two months later Seeckt put down Hitler's Putsch on 8–9 November 1923, insisting that the Bavarian Division of the Reichswehr remain loyal to the state.
[70] Seeckt, knowing the most probable outcome of such war, preferred that the Weimar Republic stay in existence, at least for the moment when painful compromises were necessary.
Seeckt strongly opposed the Locarno Treaties which he viewed as appeasement of France and was skeptical of German membership of the League of Nations because he believed it was compromising Germany's connections with the Soviet Union.
For instance, rather than the harsh punishments of the Imperial Army, minor offenders were forced to spend off-hour duties lying under a bed and singing old Lutheran hymns.
[76] This was partially because the German officers, including Seeckt, had had a disdain for a levee en masse style organisation,[76] originally stemming from Von Roon's ideas on war.
[77] He was forced to resign on 9 October 1926 because he had invited Prince Wilhelm, the grandson of the former emperor to attend army manoeuvres in the uniform of the old imperial First Foot Guards without first seeking government approval.
[80] In addition, Seeckt urged Chiang to fortify the lower Yangtze valley, and to adopt policies to industrialize China to gain independence from Western manufacturing.