The Harmar campaign was an attempt by the United States Army to subdue confederated Native Americans nations in the Northwest Territory that were seen as hostile in Autumn 1790.

United States Secretary of War Henry Knox at first resisted calls for military action against the resident Native American nations, fearing it would lead to even more conflicts.

[2] In 1789, President George Washington wrote to Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory (an entity not recognized by its Native inhabitants), and asked him to determine whether the Indians living along the Wabash and Illinois Rivers were "inclined for war or peace" with the United States.

St. Clair decided the tribes "wanted war," and called for militia forces to be assembled at Fort Washington (now Cincinnati, Ohio) and Vincennes, Indiana.

Washington and Knox ordered General Josiah Harmar to lead these forces on a punitive expedition into the Shawnee and Miami lands as retaliation for the killings of American settlers and travelers on the contested frontier, and to deter the tribes from further attacks.

In early 1790, emissaries from the United States sent word that St. Clair wished to discuss peace with the Native Americans at Vincennes.

[3] American Indian attacks continued throughout the summer, but just before the campaign was to launch, a party of Miami and Potawatomi representatives arrived at Vincennes to discuss peace.

But when St. Clair presented his plan to Washington at New York in August 1790, the president decided that a fort would be too vulnerable and too expensive.

The campaign was launched from Fort Washington on 7 October 1790, when General Harmar began the march north along the Great Miami River.

Hamtramck returned to Vincennes instead of joining Harmar,[5] who, by 13 October, had marched to within a half day's ride of Kekionga.

[10] Before dawn on 15 October, Harmar dispatched 600 men under Colonel John Hardin in hopes of surprising the Indians at Kekionga before they could finish evacuating.

On 19 October, Harmar moved his main force to the Shawnee town of Chillicothe,[note 3] two miles east of Kekionga on the Maumee River.

[14] Harmar sent out a scouting party under Colonel Hardin, who led his patrol south of modern Churubusco, Indiana.

The force consisted of 180 militia, a troop of cavalry under Major James Fontaine, and 30 regulars under Captain John Armstrong.

[17] The party came within a few miles of Kekionga, where they encountered an Indian on horseback, who fled along a minor trail leading away from the village.

Hardin ordered his force to pursue but sent Major Fontaine's cavalry back to bring up Captain William Faulkner's company, which had been left behind.

The Indian was a decoy and led Hardin into a swampy lowland bordered by fallen trees and the Eel River 13 miles northwest of Kekionga, where the horses could neither pursue nor easily retreat.

After the U.S. line fired one round from their muskets, the Native force led by white-chief Simon Girty—mostly Miami with some Shawnee and Potawatomi—charged with handheld weapons.

[12][26][note 4] On 21 October, Harmar announced that their objective was complete and ordered his forces to begin their withdrawal to Fort Washington.

[28] Eager to retaliate for their earlier losses, and hoping to discourage the Native Americans from attacking the return march, Harmar organized a force under the command of Major Wyllys.

Hardin and Hall moved to the west, south of the Native American towns, to establish positions on the western bank of the St. Joseph River.

Expecting reinforcements from Harmar, Hardin defended his position for over three hours before finally falling back to join the rest of the army.

They marched together to Kekionga and prepared for another engagement, but finding it quiet, they returned to join the main force under General Harmar.

[22] Native American leaders considered a final, decisive blow to Harmar's retreating forces, but the Odawa reportedly departed for home, interpreting a lunar eclipse as a sign that they should not attack.

[15] President Washington was furious at the news of the defeat[40] and lamented "my mind... is prepared for the worst; that is, for expence without honor or profit.

[42] Senator William Maclay accused the administration of starting a war without the authorization of Congress, perhaps as an excuse to raise a standing army.

[10] Nevertheless, John Cleves Symmes said the panic caused by the tactical Native victory would discourage new settlers from moving to the Ohio territory.

Lieutenant Ebenezer Denny wrote that the militia "appear to be raw and unused to the gun or the woods,"[51] and many arrived unfit for duty or unarmed.