[4][5][6][7] Charles Kindleberger is one of the scholars most closely associated with HST; commentators such as Benjamin Cohen regard him as the theory's founder and most influential proponent.
In the case of the hegemony of the United States after 1945, there took place attempts at initialising a stable currency by means of the International Monetary Fund, the Bretton Woods system, establishment of the World Bank, security alliances (such as NATO), and democratisation.
[21] According to Thomas J. McCormick, scholars and other experts on the systemic school define hegemony "as a single power's possession of 'simultaneous superior economic efficiency in production, trade and finance.'"
Because "world politics is not a random process of hit or miss, win or lose, depending on the luck of the draw or the brute strength of the contestants," anarchy simply doesn't play a role.
After all, long cycles have provided, for the last five centuries, a means for the successive selection and operation of numerous world leaders.
[31] With the decline of the hegemon, institutions don't automatically die, because they were constructed in a way that benefited all stakeholders; instead, they take on a life of their own (see regime theory).
[17] Consistent with hegemonic stability theory, Ikenberry argues that the ability to create institutions is partly due to power preponderance.
[17] Dominic Tierney argues that hegemonic stability theorists are wrong in assuming that unipolarity leads to a stable order.
[45] Wohlforth stressed the theoretical lag: "[The] hegemonic theory has received little shrill in the debate over the nature of the post-Cold War international system.
This omission is unwarranted, for the theory has simple and profound implications for the peacefulness of the post-Cold War international order that are backed up by a formidable body of scholarship.
[51] Until the early 2000s, Jack S. Levy and William Thompson adhered to the main Realist paradigm that hegemonic stability is theoretically impossible because other states would counter-balance.
[54] In 2009, the student and follower of Waltz, Christopher Layne, confessed: "As events transpires, however, the fate of earlier hegemons has not befallen the United States.
[62] The United States has been influential in moving many countries towards embracing the free market through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (see Washington Consensus).
[citation needed] Curiously, at the peak of the 2003 anti-hegemonic crisis, the world public opinion remained highly pro-hegemonic and convinced in the hegemonic stability.
[72] Fifteen years in the post-Cold War period, Thayer calculated the hegemonic stabilization: Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America and they include almost all of the developed economies.
[73] Ostrovsky outlined a political-economic rule which, he claims, has a very few exceptions: countries with the nominal per capita GDP above the world average formally or informally ally with the United States.
[83] With the highest gross domestic product at purchasing power parity,[84] China poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic primacy especially with the expectation that U.S. national debt could explode to 717% of GDP by 2080 according to Congressional Budget office.
On the other hand, China's economic power, not limited to but including industrialization and modernization, is rapidly burgeoning with high consumption and increasing foreign investment.
"[86] By 2018, Michael Beckley counted hundreds of books and thousands of articles envisioning the decline of the US, the rise of China and the multipolar world, and outlined an element common to these works—they all relied on gross indicators of power, such as GDP or military spending.
[87] Writing in 1992, Andrew L. Shapiro assured regarding the U.S.: With troops operating abroad in more than fifty-five countries, "a military force is extended so much that it nears a breaking point.
John Gulick points out that China's prosperity is "deeply ensconced in the 'China produces and lends, the US borrows and spends' framework".
Besides the economic interdependence, China might face additional barriers to its hegemonic aspirations, such as domestic political instability, environmental degradation, public health issues, and demographic trends.
Repeatedly he addressed the international community with anti-hegemonic agenda, arguing that the post-Cold War hegemony is unstable: "After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability."
Instead of settling conflicts they contribute to their escalation, instead of democracy and freedom they support a very dubious public ranging from neo-fascists to Islamic radicals, and instead of stable states they produce chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals.
Timo S. Koster who served at NATO as Director of Defence Policy & Capabilities criticized: A massacre is taking place in Europe and the strongest military alliance in the world is staying out of it.
[103] Even the leading Realist opponent of the HST agreed on the matter: A dominant power without rivals rising to challenge is a position without precedent.
[109][110][111]With the American hegemony counting its first decade (since 1990) and showing no signs of collapse in sight, several IR scholars supposed that to find something similar even on regional scale it is necessary to descend to pre-modern times and extend the scope beyond Europe.
The contemporary to Qin Roman hegemony was more stable with longer periods of peace, but almost each generation the system experienced major wars.
Hence, Ostrovsky concluded that the three cases - of Qin, Rome and the US - are analogous systemic transformations from warring states to hegemony to universal empire with the modern process being presently uncompleted.
"[131] A year after Ostrovsky published this anti-thesis, Russia invaded Georgia and began ever more anti-hegemonic policy, culminating with a full scale invasion of Ukraine.