Eisenhower defeated Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson II in the general election, but Lodge lost his own re-election campaign to then-Congressman Kennedy.

In 1964, Lodge won by a plurality a number of that year's party presidential primaries and caucuses on the strength of his name, reputation, and respect among many voters, though the nomination went to Barry Goldwater.

[6] After returning to Washington and winning re-election in November 1942, Lodge went to observe allied troops serving in Egypt and Libya,[7] and in that position, he was on hand for the British retreat from Tobruk.

[10] At the end of the war, in 1945, he used his knowledge of the French language and culture, gained from attending school in Paris, to aid Jacob L. Devers, the commander of the Sixth United States Army Group, to coordinate activities with the French First Army commander, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, and then carry out surrender negotiations with German forces in western Austria.

Why cannot the senator from Wisconsin get the normal treatment and be allowed to make his statement in his own way, ... and not be pulled to pieces before he has had a chance to offer one single consecutive sentence. ...

[17] Lodge noted that his objections to the conduct of the hearing and his misgivings about the inadequacy of vetting suspected traitors were missing,[18] and that the edited version read as if all committee members agreed that McCarthy was at fault and that there was no Communist infiltration of the State Department.

During his time as UN Ambassador, Lodge supported the Cold War policies of the Eisenhower administration, and often engaged in debates with the UN representatives of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, Nolting had considered it his duty to silence unfavourable press coverage of Diệm, causing him to feud with reporters who wrote that the Diem regime was corrupt and unpopular.

[23] Lodge for his part believed that if he was successful as an ambassador to an important American ally in the middle of a crisis, that would help his presidential ambitions.

[42] Lodge arrived in Saigon on August 22, 1963, finding a city gripped by protests in response to the Xá Lợi Pagoda raids that had taken place the night before.

[45] One of Lodge's first acts as ambassador was to visit the Agency for International Development (AID) office in Saigon, where two Buddhist monks had taken refuge, and to whom he agreed to grant asylum.

[46] Ever since July 1963, a group of senior South Vietnamese generals had been in contact with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), asking for American support for a coup d'état.

[51] Lodge warned that to allow Diem to continue would lead to a popular revolt that would bring in a "pro-Communist or at best neutralist set of politicians".

[52] In contrast, journalist Stanley Karnow speculated that Kennedy having embraced and praised Diem preferred that the "messy job" of overthrowing him be contracted out to Lodge, all the more so as there was always the possibility that the coup might fail, in which case the president would blame a "rogue ambassador".

[54] The CIA officer, Lucien Conein met with General Dương Văn Minh, who asked that the United States "not thwart" a coup and promise to continue to provide the aid worth about $500 million per year after Diem was overthrown.

[55] Kennedy had his National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, send Lodge a cable on October 25 saying that the United States should abandon the coup if there were "poor prospects of success".

[56] Lodge also argued to stop a coup would be to take on "an undue responsibility for keeping the incumbents in office", which was a "judgment over the affairs of Vietnam".

[58] Writing on behalf of Kennedy, Bundy sent a message to Lodge warning the possibility of a civil war between pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces "could be serious or even disastrous for U.S.

[58] Lodge ignored this order from Bundy, stating in his reply that to have Harkins in charge of the embassy during an event "so profoundly political as a change of government" would violate the principle that the serving officers of the U.S. armed forces must always be non-political.

[58] Lodge also argued that the money should be "discreetly" provided to the plotters to "buy off potential opposition" and for the United States to immediately recognize a post-Diem government.

[59] Faced with stark warnings from Lodge that the majority of the South Vietnamese people hated the Ngo family and there no possibility of a victory over the Viet Cong as long as Diem continued in power, Kennedy changed his mind yet again.

[60] In his final message to Lodge, Kennedy wrote: "If you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to the generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are better ...

[60] On November 1, 1963, at about 10 am, Lodge visited the Gia Long Palace to meet Diem who gave him a two-hour-long lecture about American ingratitude towards his regime.

[68] After his high hopes that Diem's removal would spark improvements, he reported that the new leader, General Dương Văn Minh, was a "good, well intentioned man", but asked "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?

"[68] In December 1963, the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, visited South Vietnam where he reported the American team in Saigon "lacks leadership, has been poorly informed and is not working to a common plan".

Lodge made the "Most Admired Men" list for 1962 and led major candidates such as George Romney and Nelson Rockefeller in Republican presidential polling.

Three days before the March 10 New Hampshire primary Goldwater chose to stop campaigning in the state as he predicted a victory for himself with a substantial number of votes for Lodge.

[76] In 1964, Lodge, while still Ambassador to South Vietnam, was the surprise write-in victor in the Republican New Hampshire primary, defeating declared presidential candidates Barry Goldwater and Nelson Rockefeller.

[77] His entire campaign was organized by a small band of political amateurs working independently of the ambassador, who, believing they had little hope of winning him any delegates, did nothing to aid their efforts.

Many observers remarked on the situation's similarity to 1952, when Eisenhower had unexpectedly defeated Senator Robert A. Taft, then leader of the Republican Party's conservative faction.