Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled by 6 votes to 3 that a claim of actual innocence does not entitle a petitioner to federal habeas corpus relief by way of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

Around the same time, Los Fresnos police officer Enrique Carrisalez observed a speeding vehicle traveling on the same road away from where Rucker's body had been found.

Carrisalez and his civilian friend, Enrique Hernandez, turned on the patrol car's flashing red lights and pursued the vehicle, which pulled over.

Herrera filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that new evidence demonstrated he was actually innocent of the murder of Carrisalez.

Two questions were presented for the Supreme Court's review: Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s majority opinion held that a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence did not state a ground for federal habeas relief.

In discussing what relief Herrera would be entitled to were he to succeed on his claim of “actual innocence,” Rehnquist wrote: Were petitioner to satisfy the dissent's ‘probable innocence’ standard…the District Court would presumably be required to grant a conditional order of relief, which would in effect require the State to retry petitioner 10 years after his first trial, not because of any constitutional violation which had occurred at the first trial, but simply because of a belief that in light of petitioner's new-found evidence a jury might find him not guilty at a second trial.Rehnquist’s opinion also held that Texas courts’ refusal to even consider Herrera’s newly discovered evidence did not violate due process and suggested that Herrera file a clemency petition with the Texas Board of Pardon and Paroles.

O'Connor took the position that Herrera could not be "legally and factually innocent" because he "was tried before a jury of his peers, with the full panoply of protections that our Constitution affords criminal defendants.

Antonin Scalia joined the majority, but added in passing that he found no basis, either in the Constitution or in case law, to conclude that executing an innocent but duly convicted defendant would violate the Eighth Amendment.

Blackmun would have remanded the case to the district court for a determination as to whether a hearing should be held and to resolve the merits of Herrera's claim of actual innocence.

Chastising the majority for its circumspection, Blackmun wrote, "We really are being asked to decide whether the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been validly convicted and sentenced, but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discovered evidence," and he took note of "the State of Texas' astonishing protestation to the contrary."