History of French foreign relations

Louis XV's decisions damaged the power of France, weakened the treasury, discredited the absolute monarchy, and made it more vulnerable to distrust and destruction, as happened in the French Revolution, which broke out 15 years after his death.

Spain, Naples, Great Britain, and the Netherlands joined Austria and Prussia in The First Coalition (1792–97), the first major concerted effort of multiple European powers to contain Revolutionary France.

[32] Napoleon did have some successes: he strengthened French control over Algeria, established bases in Africa, began the takeover of Indochina, and opened trade with China.

[37] Napoleon hoped that a Confederate victory would result in two weak nations on Mexico's northern borders, allowing French dominance in a country ruled by its puppet Emperor Maximilian.

[47][48][49] Once the Union won the War in spring 1865, Washington allowed supporters of Juárez to openly purchase weapons and ammunition and issued stronger warnings to Paris.

The failure stemmed from lack of realism in its conception, a gross underestimate of the power of the United States, a misunderstanding of Mexican public opinion, and recurring ineptitude in execution.

[51] French foreign policy was based on a hatred of Germany—whose larger size and faster-growing economy could not be matched—combined with a popular revanchism that demanded the return of Alsace and Lorraine.

Their decisive power resulted from clever exploitation of the preoccupation of the cabinet and parliament with internal politics; the rapid turnover of senior ministers, usually with minimal foreign-policy experience; and the growing expertise and self-assuredness of the bureaucrats.

They included Théophile Delcassé, the foreign minister from 1898 to 1906; Paul Cambon, the ambassador in London, 1890–1920; Jean Jules Jusserand in Washington from 1902 to 1924; and Camille Barrere, in Rome from 1897 to 1924.

The most dangerous episode was the Fashoda Incident of 1898 when French troops tried to claim an area in the Southern Sudan, and a British force purporting to be acting in the interests of the Khedive of Egypt arrived.

[65] One brief but dangerous dispute occurred during the Fashoda Incident of 1898 when French troops tried to claim an area in the Southern Sudan, and a more powerful British military force purporting to be acting in the interests of the Khedive of Egypt arrived.

Both sides suffered very high casualties caused by repeated infantry attacks against defensive positions protected by trenches, barbed wire, machine guns, and heavy artillery using aircraft as spotters, and poison gas.

Both sides failed to realize the stultifying effect of trench warfare on morale and the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives in futile attempts to win a "decisive battle.

By winter 1916–17 strong annexationist demands emerged on the right, calling for annexation of Germany's Saar basin to France and the creation of independent German states on the left bank of the Rhine.

At the Paris peace conference of 1919, vengeance against defeated Germany was the main French theme, and Prime Minister Clemenceau was largely effective against the moderating influences of the British and Americans.

Germany resisted then finally complied, aided by American money, and France took a more conciliatory policy by 1924 in response to pressure from Britain and the United States, as well as to French realization that its potential allies in Eastern Europe were weak and hard to coordinate.

From 1925 until his death in 1932, Aristide Briand, as prime minister during five short intervals, directed French foreign policy, using his diplomatic skills and sense of timing to forge friendly relations with Weimar Germany as the basis of a genuine peace within the framework of the League of Nations.

It set up a staggered schedule for Germany's payment of war reparations, provided for a large loan to stabilize the German currency and ended the occupation of the Ruhr.

All of France's friends were disappointed – even the Pope told the French ambassador that, "Had you ordered the immediate advance of 200,000 men into the zone the Germans had occupied, you would have done everyone a very great favor.

[113] French foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s aimed to build military alliances with small nations in Eastern Europe in order to counter the threat of German attacks.

The United States suddenly realized Germany was on the verge of controlling practically all of Europe, and it determined to rapidly build up its small Army and Air Force, and expand its Navy.

Vichy was intensely conservative and anti-Communist, but it was practically helpless with Germany controlling half of France directly and holding nearly two million French POWs as hostages.

The U.S., Britain and Canada wanted Vichy to keep nominal control of the small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon for reasons of prestige, but de Gaulle seized them anyway in late 1941.

[136] The Popular Republican Movement (MRP), a large moderate party based on the Catholic vote, dominated French foreign and colonial policies during most of the later 1940s and 1950s.

However, after the Chinese communists reached the Northern border of Vietnam in 1949, the conflict turned into a conventional war between two armies equipped with modern weapons supplied by the United States and the Soviet Union.

[147] While the strategy of pushing the Việt Minh into attacking a well-defended base in a remote part of the country at the end of their logistical trail was validated at the Battle of Nà Sản, the lack of construction materials (especially concrete), tanks (because of lack of road access and difficulty in the jungle terrain), and air cover precluded an effective defense, culminating in a decisive French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

[150] At the Geneva Conference (1954) he made a deal that gave the Việt Minh control of Vietnam north of the seventeenth parallel, and allowed him to pull out all French forces.

He managed to keep France together while taking steps to end the war, much to the anger of the Pieds-Noirs (Frenchmen settled in Algeria) and the military; both previously had supported his return to power to maintain colonial rule.

Pompidou tried to closely follow de Gaulle's policies, but he totally lacked the General's charisma, innovation and ability to startled friends and enemies alike.

[171][172] In 1977, in Opération Lamantin, Giscard ordered fighter jets to deploy in Mauritania and suppress the Polisario guerrillas fighting against Mauritanian military occupation of Western Sahara.