History of Poland (1918–1939)

[2][3][4] Its independence was confirmed by the victorious powers through the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919,[5] and most of the territory won in a series of border wars fought from 1918 to 1921.

Ignacy Daszyński headed a short-lived Polish government in Lublin from November 6 but Piłsudski had overwhelming prestige at this point.

Much of this land had been controlled by the Russian Empire since the Partitions of Poland and its inhabitants were struggling to create their own states (such as Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltics: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia).

The military conflict with the Soviets proved the determinant of Poland's frontiers in the east, a theater rendered chaotic by the repercussions of the Russian revolutions and subsequent civil war.

Lenin, leader of the new communist government of Russia, saw Poland as the bridge over which communism would pass into the labor class of a disorganized postwar Germany.

Most observers at the time marked Poland for extinction and Bolshevization,[13] However at the Battle of Warsaw Piłsudski organized a stunning counterattack that won a famous victory.

Eventually, both sides, exhausted, signed a compromise peace treaty at Riga in early 1921 that divided the disputed territories of Belarus and Ukraine between the two combatants.

There had been no serious consideration of re-establishing a monarchy, and although the great Polish noble families continued to have their names mentioned in newspapers, it was mostly in the society pages.

Roman Dmowski envisioned an ethnically-homogeneous Polish nation, and a pro-Western, anti-German path to modernization; he also espoused strong anti-Semitic attitudes, and emphasized that Poland should be a Catholic and hierarchical state.

The BMN helped elect Gabriel Narutowicz as president on the PSL ticket in 1922, but he came under nasty attacks from the right and was assassinated after five days in office.

[22][23][24] For the next decade, Piłsudski dominated Polish affairs as strongman of a generally popular centrist government, although he never held a formal title except for minister of defense.

The marshal portrayed himself as a national saviour who was above partisan politics and gained more popular support by distancing himself from the Polish Socialist Party.

Opposition voices were increasingly harassed or jailed, a situation that was not surprising in view of the government's growing fears over national security.

A compromise was reached in 1935 that somewhat quieted the situation, but the Polish Army saw a war with the USSR looming and refused to support the policy.

In 1937 the Endeks passed resolutions that "its main aim and duty must be to remove the Jews from all spheres of social, economic, and cultural life in Poland".

On international arena Poland supported the creation of Jewish state in Palestine hoping gradual emigration over next 30 years will lower Jewish population in Poland to 500,000[37] and cooperated with the leader of Revisionist Zionism, Ze'ev Jabotinsky who hoped Poland would inherit the mandate of Palestine from Great Britain; his "Evacuation Plan" called for the settlement of 1.5 million Jews within 10 years in Palestine, including 750,000 Polish Jews[38] This idea was warmly received by the Polish government which pursued a policy of mass emigration towards its Jewish population and was looking for locations for them to resettle; Jabotinsky on his part viewed antisemitism in Poland as a result of the shortage of jobs and of the economic situation, rather than rabid racism as was in Nazi Germany[39] Seven out of ten of the people worked on farms as peasants.

Polish agriculture suffered from the usual handicaps of Eastern European nations: technological backwardness, low productivity, and lack of capital and access to markets.

[40][41] The socialist politician Bolesław Limanowski thought deeply about Agrarianism and worked out an eclectic program that fit Polish conditions.

Poland with 35 million people had a large population but a thin industrial base; its war plans focused on the Soviet Union instead of Germany.

Overy says that of all the new states in Europe: In February 1921, Poland signed a secret military agreement with France, which obliged each party to mutual aid in the event of German aggression.

Polish membership there could have provided additional security; however, relations with Prague were unfriendly due to border disputes, so they never reached an agreement.

Czechoslovakian President Edvard Beneš warned that military or even strong political ties with Poland could prove dangerous for Czechoslovakia[50][51][52][53][54] and rebuffed Beck's proposal to establish anti-German cooperation.

The limited defense budget allowed minimal mechanization; most weapons were produced in Poland, but the production rate was low (7TP tank is a prime example), and foreign exchange was scarce.

After the death of Piłsudski in May 1935, policies in Poland were set by five senior officials, including President Ignacy Mościcki; Vice-President Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski; the Premier, Felicjan Sławoj Składkowski; and Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz, the Commander-in-Chief of the army.

"Courage, flair, heroism, devouring ambition, all these they had in abundance; realism and worst-case analysis, let alone defeatism or appeasement, were alien to them entirely.

"[65] Poland's dream of leading a bloc of neutral nations in Eastern Europe collapsed after 1933 with the advent of Hitler's expansionism and the obvious warning of France's desire to resist Germany's expansion.

In October 1938, the Munich Agreement, with British and French approval, allowed Germany to take over areas of Czechoslovakia with a significant German minority, the so-called Sudetenland.

[73] After it rejected German territorial demands regarding Danzig and Gdańsk Pomerania, Poland's position was steadily weakening as other nations such as Hungary and Romania gravitated toward Germany's orbit.

Hitler thought Britain and France were bluffing, but he handled the Soviet problem in late August, by a stunning agreement with Stalin in what amounted to a friendly alliance, which included secret provisions to partition Poland—and indeed divide up much of eastern Europe[74] The British and French offer was not a bluff—they declared war on Germany when it invaded Poland, but neither was in a position to provide serious help.

Poland itself had a million-man army (and another million in the reserves) but fell far short in terms of training, airpower, artillery, tanks, machine guns, radios, and trucks.