History of the Afghan Armed Forces (2002–2021)
After the formation of the Karzai administration in late 2001, the Afghan Armed Forces were gradually reestablished by the United States and its allies.
Initially, a new land force, the Afghan National Army (ANA), was created, whose planned size grew from 70,000 in 2002 to, eventually, a target of 194,000 set in mid-2011.
[8] The Afghan Ministry of Defence loudly objected to the smaller, volunteer, nature of the new army, a change from the previous usage of conscripts.
[11] US trainers frequently removed the cell phones of Afghan soldiers hours before a mission for fear that the operation would be compromised.
One in every four combat soldiers quit the Afghan Army during the 12-month period ending in September 2009, according to data from the US Defense Department and the Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan.
[18] The motto of the army was reported as “God, Country, Duty”[19] In early 2015, Philip Munch of the Afghanistan Analysts' Network wrote that "... the available evidence suggests that many senior Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) members, in particular, use their positions to enrich themselves.
Rather it appears that the political economy of the ANSF prevents them from working like modern organisations – the very prerequisite of the Resolute Support Mission.
[...] There is evidence that Afghan officers and officials, especially in the higher echelons, appropriate large parts of the vast resource flows which are directed by international donors into the ANA.
"[21] "Green-on-blue" or "insider attacks," in which Afghan soldiers or police officers turned their weapons on American, European or Australian counterparts, became a major concern in 2010 and peaked in 2012—when they accounted for nearly 25% of ISAF casualties—before declining during 2013–2014 as international forces withdrew from the conflict.
One theory—based on a 2011 study conducted by research psychologist Major Jeffrey T. Bordin, who interviewed Afghan and American troops regarding their perceptions of each other—posited that the insider attacks were the result of cultural incompatibility and resentment.
While approximately 10% of the cases were linked to high-profile provocations such as the 2012 Afghanistan Quran burning protests and the Kandahar massacre, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System intercepts showed that 56% of inside attackers interacted with the Taliban before deciding to strike, and there was circumstantial evidence of Taliban contact in a further 19% of cases.
To reduce "green-on-blue" violence, ISAF soldiers were reminded to "respect Islam" and "avoid arrogance," armed guards were deployed as "guardian angels" to watch over joint exercises, and counterintelligence surveillance of previously vetted Afghan troops was expanded, among other preventative measures.
However, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) said in January 2013:[28] Determining ANSF strength is fraught with challenges.
[44] According to American journalist Annie Jacobsen, most Afghan fighters being trained by the US habitually used opium, and it was a constant struggle to field them in a sober state.
Jacobsen wrote that a 2018 report by a US inspector general noted 5,753 cases of "gross human rights abuses by Afghan forces", including "routine enslavement and rape of underage boys by Afghan commanders"[45] Partly this reporting is referring to aggravated Bacha bazi type practices, which are centuries old.
According to a 2017 report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), between of 2010 and 2016, the Department of Defense made 5,753 Leahy Law vetting requests for Afghan security forces.
[46] The Leahy law prohibits U.S. funding of foreign security units if there are credible reports of gross violation of human rights.
According to SIGAR, between 2010 and 2016, 75 allegations of gross violations of human rights by Afghan security forces, including murder and 16 cases of child sexual assault were reported to the Department of Defense.
"[47][48] Large numbers of military bases were found across the country, including major ones in the provinces of Balkh, Farah, Ghazni, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Maidan Wardak, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika and Parwan.
The Marshal Fahim National Defense University was located in Kabul province and consists of a headquarters building, classrooms, dining facility, library, and medical clinic.
Both countries had supported the Northern Alliance, with funding, training, supplies and medical treatment of wounded fighters, against the Taliban prior to 2002.
In 2013, after years of subtle reminders, the Afghan government sent a wish list of heavy weapons to India.The list includes as many as 150 T-72 battle tanks, 120 (105 mm) field guns, a large number of 82 mm mortars, one Antonov An-32 medium lift transport aircraft, two squadrons of Mil Mi-17 medium lift and Mi-35 attack helicopters, and a large number of trucks.
[56] Other state suppliers included Brazil; China; France; Germany; Italy; Pakistan; Turkey; the United Kingdom; and Uzbekistan.
Defense Minister Wardak explained that "what we are asking to acquire is just the ability to defend ourselves, and also to be relevant in the future so that our friends and allies can count on us to participate in peacekeeping and other operations of mutual interest.
