History of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (1648–1764)

[2] The government became ineffective because of large scale internal conflicts (e.g. Lubomirski's Rokosz against John II Casimir and rebellious confederations), corrupted legislative processes (such as the infamous use of the liberum veto) and manipulation by foreign interests.

The magnates built splendid palaces of brick and stone in the main cities and on their rural estates; the wooden manors and feasting social life style of the szlachta attempted to imitate the surroundings and lives of the rich, famous and powerful.

The serf labor force was displaced and their plots taken over under estate consolidation schemes (to further increase the already dominant folwark portion of the rural economy), or manorial duties were replaced by feudal rent arrangements if that seemed more profitable to landlords.

The nascent manifestations of capitalist practices of the Renaissance era were weakened or wiped out, which irreversibly retarded the short- and long-term aspects of economic development in absolute terms or in comparison with Poland's neighbors, or even with Silesia and parts of Pomerania, areas lost by the Crown.

[9] The peasants, who had traditionally constituted a vital part of the town merchants' clientele, now impoverished and forced by their feudal masters to limit their purchases to what was produced or sold within their home estate, largely stopped plying their role in the internal market.

Polonization, catholicizing, state support for the Uniate Church (especially in western Ukraine) at the expense of the often persecuted Orthodox religion, and denying the Ukrainian people cultural opportunities were some of the factors that contributed greatly to the unrest.

Having suffered a wrong from Daniel Czapliński, a Polish nobleman, and unable to obtain redress through official channels, Khmelnytsky headed for the Zaporizhian Sich, where he agitated among the Cossacks already embittered by the repressions of the 1630s, and now also made restless by the cancellation of the war they were told to expect.

The Cossack hetman turned to his prior concepts of increasing cooperation with Russia (talks with the Tsardom took place already in 1651, but the deal was not consummated at that time because of the Berestechko defeat), the country of more distant common historic tradition, but close linguistic, religious and East Slavic cultural ties with Ukraine.

Until his death in 1657 the Cossack leader, despite the Pereyaslav treaty, conducted independent policy, intent on taking advantage of the calamities that had befallen upon the Commonwealth, but also considered an improvement of the relationship with the great power that he shook up ("fatally wounded", according to historian Timothy Snyder).

In 1655 the Commonwealth's survival had become endangered, when the huge federation, already critically weakened by the offensive of the Russians, who occupied most of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and by Khmelnytsky's Cossacks holding fast to the lands they overran in Ukraine, was subjected to a massive attack by Sweden.

[25][37][41] The crucial factor that doomed the Hadiach treaty was that the sizable regular Ruthenian nobility (not magnates), which would constitute the principal Ukrainian elite with a strong interest in the establishment of the Duchy of Ruthenia, was after ten years of warfare physically eliminated almost in its entirety.

[43] In the years that followed, Doroshenko led Cossack fighters and participated in political maneuvers involving the Commonwealth, Russia and the Ottoman Empire in vain pursuit of Khmelnytsky's dream of building a strong Ukrainian state.

The Commonwealth being in a state of internal disorder and incapable of effective defense, the foremost stronghold of Kamieniec Podolski (Kamianets-Podilskyi) capitulated, the Turkish army moved toward Lwów, while the Tatars raided west reaching the San River, taking huge numbers of civilian captives.

[45] In addition to conducting this last assertive Commonwealth attempt in the Baltic area, John III for a time was also involved in anti-Habsburg diversion in Hungary, engulfed by the Kuruc uprising led by Imre Thököly.

The Holy League arrangements severely limited the Commonwealth's ability to exercise its options and future reverses can be traced to the failure of the decentralized, ineffective Polish diplomacy to protect through negotiations the country's national interest.

From the time of John Casimir and his wife Marie Louise, who cared about the well-being of the Commonwealth, but were obsessively preoccupied with the issue of royal succession, the Polish–Lithuanian state was informally divided into a number of territorial domains, practically controlled by regional top feudal lords, inclined to pursue their private and familial interests in the first place.

Although during the sejm of 1661 John Casimir predicted and warned of partition of the Commonwealth by Russia, Brandenburg and Austria if unsettled successions cause significant interregnum periods, by that time the reform program had been defeated and the army remained unpaid.

In 1672, after more legislative attempts were thwarted and as the Commonwealth was facing an imminent Ottoman invasion, Prażmowski demanded the King's abdication and Michał responded by calling up pospolite ruszenie turned into the Confederation of Gołąb, ostensibly for the country's defense, but in fact to protect and promote the monarch's faction.

A great military leader, John III Sobieski became fascinated by the possibility of establishing a natively Polish ruling dynasty, and like his predecessors he allowed the succession issue to consume his attention in vain, at the expense of urgent matters of the deteriorating state.

[55] Augustus II stationed the powerful Saxon army within the Commonwealth and applied various external pressures in order to alter its political system, which only alienated the Polish nobility and further demoralized the broader society, relegated to watching the corrupt, but unsuccessful at all levels establishment.

The Swedish monarch expected considerable support within the Commonwealth, where in Lithuania the powerful and abusive Sapieha magnate faction was defeated in a civil war (Battle of Valkininkai (Olkieniki) in November 1700) and the oligarchs appealed to Charles for protection and the removal of Augustus.

Stanisław and von Krassow (commander of the Swedish units left in Poland), thwarted by the Sandomierz confederates again, were unable to break through to join Charles who was stuck in Ukraine, where the Cossack hetman Ivan Mazepa largely failed to deliver on his promised support for the Swedes.

Nobility's opposition to the stationing of Saxon troops in Poland, its cost and internally threatening role, led to military resistance, first attempted in 1714 and then in a more definitive way pursued in 1715, when the action unified the pro-Swedish and pro-Russian camps and Peter I's support was secured.

[60] The spreading movement, unable to fulfill its mission alone, requested mediation by Peter I. Augustus agreed and several months of negotiations facilitated by the Russian ambassador followed, with the fighting still intermittently taking place.

Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor and George I of Great Britain worked out an alliance with Augustus II in Vienna in 1719, aimed at checking the expansion of imperial Russia, but requiring participation of the Commonwealth.

The affair reflected general deterioration of religious tolerance in the Commonwealth, was widely condemned abroad and only the death of Peter I prevented a foreign military intervention prepared in response, with the participation of Frederick William I of Prussia.

[61] The Saxon court in the meantime was able to arrive at an understanding with St. Petersburg and Vienna, and through the concessions extended, including giving up Courland for Ernst Johann von Biron, a favorite of Tsaritsa Anna of Russia, secured their support in the secret Löwenwolde Treaty.

[64] The magnate factions utilized foreign help: The Potocki group was supported by Prussia of Frederick II, the Familia of the Czartoryskis perceived imperial Russia as the future ultimate arbiter of the Commonwealth's fate.

Numerous Italian artists worked in the Commonwealth, supported by the royal and magnate courts, while many among the Polish upper nobility traveled to Italy to study, participate in pilgrimages or for sightseeing, and increasingly also to France, to cultivate aristocratic contacts and familiarize themselves with the Western ways of life, at such major centers as Paris or Versailles.

The nobility of the Commonwealth developed a preference for Tatar, Turkish, Persian and also East Slavic artistic tastes, which had to do with the wars fought on the Islamic front and the spoils brought back and with the presumed Black Sea shores (Sarmatian) origins of Polish nobles.