History of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (1961–1972)

The Rhodesian Light Infantry's performance during this early period of the Bush War is generally considered to have been of a very high standard, with historian Alexandre Binda pointing to Operation Cauldron (1968) in particular as having contributed to the Battalion's formidable "fighting character" and reputation as "outstanding and peerless anti-terrorist fighters".

[n 1] The majority of the first RLI recruits were from South Africa, with the rest predominantly from Southern Rhodesia and Britain: "We were a varied, rough and colourful bunch of skates," remembered Paul Wellburn, a member of the first intake, from Bulawayo.

The number of soldiers absent without leave reached a peak in April 1961, when 29 men deserted to fight as mercenaries for Moise Tshombe's secessionist State of Katanga, enticed by the hefty financial incentives offered by Katangese agents based at a Bulawayo hotel.

[n 2] The Battalion's first operational duty was to relieve the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), which was maintaining a cordon around the town of Gwanda, 130 kilometres (81 mi) south of Bulawayo, during a local outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.

[n 3] The RLI was due to transfer to Salisbury in any case, with a state-of-the art headquarters at Cranborne Barracks already under construction,[8] but in light of the burglary it relocated first to Inkomo Garrison, about 50 kilometres (31 mi) away from the capital.

The second was based on a dark green background and featured the regimental badge in its centre, surrounded by a wreath of flame lilies, Rhodesia's national flower,[n 4] and topped, as with the Queen's colour, with the royal crown.

[10][15] Two months later the Regiment found itself in a similar role when it and the RAR once again worked together on Operation Phoenix, which involved guarding the families of 600 chiefs and headmen participating in an indaba at Domboshawa, 27 kilometres (17 mi) north of Salisbury,[10] on the subject of Rhodesian independence.

[21] A personable, jovial commander, Walls shared Smith's views on the independence question, and less than a month after his appointment incurred a reproach from his superior, Brigadier Rodney Putterill, when he allowed his men to wear paper hats marked "RLI for UDI" at Christmas dinner.

[24] The recreation of the RLI as a commando battalion drew scepticism from elsewhere in the armed forces, and in part to prove doubters wrong Walls organised a demonstrative anti-guerrilla war game, Exercise Flick Knife, in May 1965.

[29] Smith was proven correct when a British Ministry of Defence council, headed by Denis Healey, determined such intervention "impossible", leading Wilson to rule out the use of military force.

They intended to operate around Sinoia and Karoi, but one of the gangs made a serious error on 17 September when in the early evening it stopped a civilian van about 18 kilometres (11 mi) south of Chirundu.

[37] The next guerrilla incursion came on 1 August 1967, when a combined force of 79 ZIPRA and South African Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) fighters[n 7] crossed the Zambezi about 20 kilometres (12 mi) east of Victoria Falls.

[40] The insurgents were consistently undone in their incursions by the suspicion of Rhodesia's rural blacks, whose tribal chiefs and headmen would often work together to inform the police and security forces of the infiltrators' presence.

[41] This proved to be no exception: when a cadre visited a local kraal early on 31 August to obtain food, an old woman invited him to stay and kept him there while she sent a young girl to alert the security forces.

The next day, on 1 September, some 2 Commando troops in ambush were informed by a tractor driver that he had been given money by 14 guerrillas the previous night to buy mielie-meal for them, and that they would be collecting it from him at his kraal that evening.

[43] Despite the death or capture of 77 out of 79 men, ZAPU, from its base in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, did not regard the incursion as a failure; on the contrary, its leaders were pleased that they had inflicted some casualties on the Rhodesian African Rifles.

Buoyed by what they perceived as a success, they planned another operation to take place in northern Mashonaland: about 100 men—75 ZIPRA and 25 MK—were to infiltrate the Zambezi valley and establish a series of camps, including underground caches containing food, clothing, weapons and other equipment.

[2] Two Vampire fighter-bombers and two Canberra bombers were detailed to circle the area and provide air strikes as needed; the mere presence of these aircraft demoralised many cadres into deserting before they even met the Rhodesian forces.

[46] A patrol of 13 troopers from 14 Troop, 3 Commando, led by Lieutenant Bert Sachse, made first contact with the enemy on the morning of 18 March, encountering 14 nationalists near the Angwa River in the Mana Pools area.

Lance-Corporal Dennis Croukamp "on his own initiative and with complete disregard for his own safety" in the words of the official report, twice crawled forward to throw grenades at the enemy position to allow the troop to redeploy into better cover.

Having acquitted themselves well during the operation, the young RLI troopers, many still teenagers, earned high praise from Platoon Warrant Officer Herod of the RAR, who had been wounded fighting alongside them on the Maura on 18 March 1968.

"[n 10] Covering FN MAG fire from a Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) Alouette III helicopter, with Major Robert Southey aboard, then allowed Strong's men to pull back.

Now covered by the Rhodesian ground troops and Frantans[n 11] dropped by Percival Provosts, the South Africans made several unsuccessful attempts to pull back from the banks of the gully throughout the afternoon which led to two injuries and the death of Constable du Toit.

The SAP men were eventually able to withdraw under cover of darkness, while Rhodesian and South African injured were uplifted by helicopter in an action described by Southey as "sheer brilliance".

Petter-Bowyer's helicopters spotted the insurgents encamped by a stream beneath some dark, shady trees, leading Strong's 12 Troop, 3 Commando to be brought forward to contact them the following morning.

[64] The same was not true, however, for the Rhodesian government, which on 20 September 1968 accepted an invitation from Wilson for a new round of talks, this time aboard HMS Fearless, anchored off Gibraltar, for four days starting on 9 October 1968.

A tracking team led by Lieutenant Nigel Henson first made contact around noon on 21 January, when concealed ZIPRA cadres from Gang 2 fired upon them with an RPD machine-gun and AK-47 and SKS rifles.

The RLI moved up again at dawn the next day and met the insurgents at 07:30, when a stick of five 1 Commando men led by Lieutenant Bruce Snelgar was sighted in an area of thick bush by three guerrillas from Gang 2.

"They were in a state of disarray following their decisive defeats within Rhodesia, so they took the opportunity of consolidating their position by sending their terrorists outside the country on extended courses to Russia, Cuba and North Korea.

The men gave demonstrations of drilling, physical training and unarmed combat; a staged assault on a guerrilla camp was held by 2 Commando, using blank ammunition and dummy mortars.