History of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (1972–1977)

Hurricane would last for the rest of the war, eventually just one of seven operational areas defined across Rhodesia by the security forces—Operations Thrasher, Repulse and Tangent followed in 1976, Grapple began a year later and Splinter, covering Lake Kariba, started in 1978.

The quick reaction time made possible by the Fireforce, combined with the observational capacity of the new Selous Scouts deep cover reconnaissance unit, helped the security forces to counter ZANLA's new Maoist tactics.

"ZANLA made careful preparation for their coming campaign," writes Wood: "politicising the rural people in their Maoist fashion, establishing local committees, contact men, feeders, security procedures, and infiltration and exit routes.

Sable followed on from a Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) action in the same area against several local FRELIMO base camps, which were fighting the Portuguese Armed Forces and at the same time assisting ZANLA.

The plan called for 2 and 3 Commandos and Support Group, RLI to march due north from where the Ruya River met the border with Rhodesia and set up a stop line about 30 kilometres (19 mi) in.

Rhodesian intelligence, which had been monitoring ZANLA's activity and preparations, grew curious when over a four-week period in November 1972 sources of information suddenly began to "dry up", in the words of historian Alexandre Binda.

This false veneer of security was smashed on 21 December 1972 when a group of ten ZANLA cadres led by Rex Nhongo[n 4] attacked the white-owned Altena Farm near the north-eastern village of Centenary, about 30 kilometres (19 mi) west of Mount Darwin.

The isolated house had no telephone or any other means of contacting neighbours, and de Borchgrave was wary of being ambushed should he drive his car out, so after a short time comforting the children he set out across country on foot to seek help and alert the authorities.

News of the second attack reached Buttenshaw and Sachse around midnight, and they deployed immediately, but having discovered a mine near Altena they disembarked from the vehicles 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) from Whistlefield and made the final approach on foot.

The tracks of the ZANLA fighters were discovered on 27 December on the western side of the farm and the trackers asked Buttenshaw and Sachse to bring the vehicles carrying the heavy equipment around to meet them.

[13] In their haste, Nhongo's cadres had not attempted to conceal their tracks as they headed west, towards the Musengezi river—Buttenshaw's pursuant RLI men therefore realised how quickly the guerrillas were moving and sped up their chase.

[12] Rather than having the tribesmen actively volunteer information about insurgent movements and locations, as had happened during previous infiltrations,[19] the Rhodesian Security Forces now met an increasingly silent and sometimes hostile welcome from the rural blacks.

[22] ZANLA cadres attacked the school at St Albert's Mission between Centenary and Mount Darwin in July 1973 and abducted 292 pupils and staff, whom they force-marched north into the Zambezi valley and towards Mozambique.

[20] The security forces attempted to prevent the rural blacks from cooperating with ZANLA by instituting collective punishment on villages where cadres were known to have received assistance: for example, curfews would be imposed, and schools and stores closed.

"[23] The Protected Village Programme started on 27 July 1974, when Operation Overload began in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands,[26] where according to Reid-Daly "apparent support for the ZANLA cause was, without doubt, overwhelming".

The security forces considered how to contact the guerrillas on their own terms; the new ZANLA tactics were based around deliberately avoiding confrontation so far as was possible and hiding amongst the local population, so it was difficult for the Rhodesians to fight them face-to-face.

Hearing the Fireforce coming from this distance would give the cadres plenty of time to hide themselves, so the RhAF pilots would attempt to approach their targets heading upwind to minimise this effect.

[35] Fireforce, used in conjunction with the Selous Scouts' methods, proved very effective for the security forces, who began to gain the upper hand; the doubling of the length of National Service from six to 12 months also contributed, as it gave the Rhodesians more troops.

Under the leadership of a new commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel David Parker[n 12]—nicknamed "The King" by the RLI men[37]—the Battalion also embarked on a large and successful overseas recruitment drive starting in 1974, seeking foreign volunteers from Europe, the Americas and Oceania.

[36] The impact of the security forces' decisive counter-campaign was to be undone by two drastic changes to the geopolitical situation in 1974 and 1975, each relating to one of the Rhodesian government's two main backers, Portugal and South Africa.

In Lisbon, a military coup on 25 April 1974 replaced the right-wing Estado Novo administration with a leftist government opposed to the unpopular Colonial War in Angola, Mozambique and Portugal's other African territories.

[n 13] In an attempt to resolve the situation in Rhodesia, South African Prime Minister B. J. Vorster negotiated a deal: Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda would prevent infiltrations by Rhodesian guerrillas and in return Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith would agree to a ceasefire and "release all political detainees"—the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU—who would then attend a conference in Rhodesia, united under a single banner and led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and his African National Council (ANC).

Far from being seen as a gesture of potential reconciliation, the ceasefire and release of the nationalist leaders gave the message to the rural population that the security forces had been defeated and that the guerrillas were in the process of emulating FRELIMO's victory in Mozambique.

Judging from the silence and inactivity that the guerrillas had fled, and thinking that the two downed men were still alive, Major Hank Meyer told Lieutenant Joe du Plooy to sweep around the river with two 7 Troop sticks and send a medic out to give treatment.

Flying at low altitude, in keeping with procedure, the helicopter flew into a rusty, long forgotten hawser cable, unmarked on any maps and years before used to pass logs down a steep slope.

ZANLA favoured a continuation of their existing Maoist tactics, spreading themselves amongst the rural people and politicising them "by fair means or foul", as Wood says, while ZIPRA preferred to overtly recruit fighters and train them overseas for conventional invasions.

[54] Whereas conscripted men had previously been of a small enough volume that they could be gently assimilated into the combat ranks over time, Intake 150 gave the RLI so many new, inexperienced rookies that they would often outnumber the veterans in the field.

[58] Keeping his past life a secret, he became a popular and well-regarded soldier in 3 Commando,[53] and eventually rose to the rank of Lance-Corporal, taking command of a Fireforce stick on Operation Thrasher shortly before he was killed in action on 7 November 1976 by an errant shot from one of his own men.

[4][60] The MG 151/20 20 mm cannon mounted on the K-car "proved extremely effective", Binda says, firing down on the cadres to cut off escape routes, and killing several of them as the Rhodesian soldiers advanced in from all directions.

RLI Rifleman Grobler was lightly wounded and evacuated to Ruda, as were two privates of the RAR, Philip Chagwiza and Chikoto Saxon, who were both hit by small arms fire from the ground while still in the helicopters.

A black-and-white photograph of a soldier and a gentleman in a dark suit and hat shaking hands. The man in the suit is facing away from the camera. The soldier wears a dark-coloured beret with insignia on it and a camouflage shirt on which the sleeves are rolled up. A cross-shaped medal is prominent on his chest pocket. In the background, out of focus, four dark figures can be seen.
Acting Lieutenant Nigel John Theron of 2 Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry received the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia from President John Wrathall on 15 October 1976, having displayed "gallantry and leadership in action" in several contacts with guerrillas on Operation Hurricane. [ n 1 ]
The "provinces" and sectors defined by the ZANLA leadership. The "province" names, Tete , Manica and Gaza , correspond to the neighbouring Mozambican provinces in which local ZANLA commanders were based. The sectors (apart from those in Gaza "province") were named for tribal spirits, places and leaders of the Shona people . [ 7 ]
Existing and planned protected villages (PVs) on 6 January 1978: [ 21 ]
A small, camouflaged military helicopter, seen from the right and from below. South African markings can be seen on the aircraft's tail.
Fireforce was based largely around the use of Alouette IIIs , like this one of the South African Air Force . [ 29 ]
Over the course of the 1970s, the Rhodesian Security Forces defined seven operational areas across the country. The first, Operation Hurricane, was set up in December 1972. Operation Thrasher followed in February 1976, and by the end of the war Operations Grapple, Repulse, Splinter and Tangent were also running. A seventh operational area existed for the capital, Salisbury , which was called SALOPS ("Salisbury Operations"). [ 7 ] [ 49 ]