[2] Sperrle did not distinguish himself in battle as his fellow staff officers in World War II had done, but he forged a solid record in the aerial reconnaissance field.

[3] After suffering severe injuries in a crash,[4] Sperrle moved to the air observer school at Cologne thereafter and when the war ended he was in command of flying units attached to the 7th Army.

Sperrle was selected for his expertise in technical matters; he was seen as highly qualified staff officer with combat experience in commanding the flying units of the 7th army during the war.

[21] Richthofen and Sperrle agreed German support should be limited, for Franco's rule would not be perceived as legitimate if he received lavish foreign aid.

Pilots suffered from circulation problems in non-pressurised cockpits while flying close to the top of the peaks, but only one aircraft and five men were lost to the natural barriers.

[36] Returning north, In August and September 1937 Sperrle's legion assisted Franco's victory at the Battle of Santander with only 68 aircraft—none of the Brunete losses had been replaced.

[47] The Munich Agreement ended the prospect of war and Sperrle's forces landed at Aš airfield as the Wehrmacht annexed the Sudetenland in October 1938.

[56] While guarding the Western Front during the Phoney War, Sperrle's small fleet of 306 aircraft—which included 33 obsolete Arado Ar 68s—fought off probing attacks of French and British aircraft.

[55] Sperrle developed a reputation as a gourmet, whose private transport aircraft featured a refrigerator to keep his wines cool, and although as corpulent as Göring, he was reliable and as ruthless as his superior.

[60] I. Fliegerkorps covered a line running from Eupen, to the Luxembourg border, westward through Fumay, south of Laon to Senlis and the Seine at Vernon through to the English Channel with just 471 aircraft.

Sperrle's air fleet engaged in operations supporting Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt and Army Group A in the Battle of Belgium and Battle of France, as well as Army Group C.[61][62] Sperrle's counter-air campaign started badly, reflecting poor photographic interpretation of targets, though he later claimed Luftflotte 3's operations were decisive in achieving air superiority.

Sperrle's job was to protect Guderian's southern flank, though he was ordered to assist against an attempted counter-attack near Arras by supporting the 4th Army advance north.

[82] On 5 June Sperrle's forces flew eight bombing operations against railways and localities, 21 to 31 against road targets, 12 against troop columns and 34 to 42 against French Army defences or strongpoints.

[91][92] Joseph Schmid, the OKL's chief intelligence officer, was primarily responsible for providing inaccurate and distorted information to senior German air commanders encouraging enormous over-confidence.

Diversionary attacks, intended to draw off part of the defences from the south, would be made on north-east England, south-east Scotland and shipping in adjacent waters by Luftflotte 5 from Norwegian and Danish airfields.

"[110] From, the tactical perspective, improper positioning of Sperrle's fighter leaders allowed RAF pilots to mass attacks against isolated elements of dive-bombers, causing heavy losses.

Surviving German records suggest that the aim of the Coventry raid was to disrupt production and reconstruction critical to the automotive industry, but also to dehouse workers.

[112] In May 1941, the final full-month of the German night offensive, Luftwaffe forces operating against western cities in Britain bombed Dublin, ostensibly in error.

[167] In 1942, anti-shipping operations near the British coast proved too expensive, and the demands of the Mediterranean Theatre and Eastern Front diverted some of the precious Focke-Wulf Fw 200s.

[170] Making matters worse, the Luftwaffe did nothing effective to counter RAF Coastal Command's Bay of Biscay offensive against U-boat transit routes.

[175] Luftflotte 3 became solely responsible for maintaining the pressure on British cities, sea communications and protecting German-occupied territory from RAF incursions, named the Circus offensives.

The invasion provided bases for Sperrle's fleet to strike at shipping in the Mediterranean Sea but left him with only four fighter groups to defend northern France.

Sperrle resisted attempts by Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte to gain control of anti-aircraft forces or to allow the physical degradation of his air fleet, and the offensive mindedness of the OKL favoured front-line units.

A report from Luftflotte 3 recognised the size and defensive power of American bombers required a timely interception by massed formations for any chance of success.

Given the low priority for their production, Sperrle went for periods with no night–fighting capabilities despite the crucial geographical position of his air fleet and the exposure of important French industries to night attack.

[225] The feeble offensive was mocked by the British, and Peltz' forces incurred a 10 percent loss rate per sortie, for little military gain and 329 bombers were lost.

Reading the reports, Allied intelligence deduced that the bombing operations against bridges, west of the Seine, and fighter activity between Mantes and Le Mans, had convinced the air fleet staff the invasion would take place in the Pas de Calais.

[242] Luftflotte 3 used the latest novelty weapons in a bid to attack Allied shipping—the Mistel, Messerschmitt Me 262 and Henschel Hs 129 debuted in June and July 1944 in very small numbers.

[246] Another decrypted message from Luftflotte 3 to OKL stated that air attacks had depleted fuel stocks to such an extent that June's allocation would have to last to the end of July.

[251] By the time of his dismissal, Sperrle had purportedly long since lost faith in the German war effort and in Hitler and Göring's military leadership.