2008) was a California Supreme Court case where the court held that laws treating classes of persons differently based on sexual orientation should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and that an existing statute and initiative measure limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violate the rights of same-sex couples under the California Constitution and may not be used to preclude them from marrying.

[3] The writ of mandate directing the state government to comply with the ruling and grant same-sex marriages was issued by the Superior Court of California on June 19, 2008.

This decision did not disturb that part of the court's holding that gay men and lesbians constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection under Art.

[7]: 12 The Superior court refused to grant the groups' request for an immediate stay, and the City and County continued to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.

[9] San Francisco Superior Court Judge Richard A. Kramer held for the plaintiffs, finding that the marriage restriction was invalid under the strict scrutiny standard based on a suspect classification of gender.

The court found that "equal respect and dignity" of marriage is a "basic civil right" that cannot be withheld from same-sex couples, that sexual orientation is a protected class like race and gender, and that any classification or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the California State Constitution.

[10] The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, by contrast, did not find sexual orientation to be a protected class, and instead voided its gay-marriage ban on rational basis review.

[13] It further rejected moves to delay enforcement of the decision until after the November election, when voters would decide whether to reinstate a ban on same-sex nuptials.

[14] In the majority decision: [U]nder this state's Constitution, the constitutionally based right to marry properly must be understood to encompass the core set of basic substantive legal rights and attributes traditionally associated with marriage that are so integral to an individual's liberty and personal autonomy that they may not be eliminated or abrogated by the Legislature or by the electorate through the statutory initiative process.

[7]: 6 [S]trict scrutiny ... is applicable here because (1) the statutes in question properly must be understood as classifying or discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, a characteristic that we conclude represents — like gender, race, and religion — a constitutionally suspect basis upon which to impose differential treatment, and (2) the differential treatment at issue impinges upon a same-sex couple's fundamental interest in having their family relationship accorded the same respect and dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex couple.

[15][T]he majority's approach has removed the sensitive issues surrounding same-sex marriage from their proper forum—the arena of legislative resolution—and risks opening the door to similar treatment of other, less deserving, claims of a right to marry.

By thus moving the policy debate from the legislative process to the court, the majority engages in faulty constitutional analysis and violates the separation of powers.