Ahmad Edwards, who suffers from schizophrenia, tried to steal a pair of shoes from a department store in Indiana.

He was convicted of criminal recklessness and theft, but the jury could not reach a verdict as to the attempted murder and battery charges.

Edwards proceeded to trial with appointed counsel, and was convicted of the attempted murder and battery charges.

Even so, the right of self-representation is not absolute, and standby counsel may be appointed to assist the pro se defendant in matters of procedure and courtroom decorum.

The crucial difference in Edwards, was that the pro se defendant was asking to proceed to trial without counsel.

The Court ultimately concluded that, in light of these rules, a state may require an otherwise competent criminal defendant to proceed to trial with the assistance of counsel.

For the Court, it was "common sense" that a defendant's mental illness might impair his ability to accomplish these tasks—tasks that any lawyer must if he is to press his client's case effectively.

"A right of self-representation at trial will not affirm the dignity of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel."

"No trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental condition stands hopeless and alone before the court."

Because counsel's role under the Sixth Amendment is merely one of "assistance," or because the "right of self-representation could also be seen as a part of the traditional meaning of the Due Process Clause," Faretta had held that a state may not force a lawyer upon a defendant who does not want one.

Finally, consistent with his originalist theory, Scalia sought to quell doubts regarding the authenticity of the right of self-representation.

"The right is not explicitly set forth in the text of the Sixth Amendment, and some Members of this Court [including Justice Breyer] have expressed skepticism about Faretta's holding."