Individual fishing quota

The regulator sets a species-specific total allowable catch (TAC), typically by weight and for a given time period.

[2]: 218  The first countries to adopt individual fishing quotas were the Netherlands, Iceland and Canada in the late 1970s, and the most recent is the United States Scallop General Category IFQ Program in 2010.

[4] Historically, inshore and deepwater fisheries were in common ownership where no one had a property right to the fish (i.e., owned them) until after they had been caught.

This is the idea that the fisherman does not have a property right to the resource until point of capture, encouraging competitive behaviour and overcapitalisation in the industry.

The use of IFQs has often been related to broader processes within neoliberalism that tend to utilise markets as a regulatory tool.

There have also been similar legal battles regarding the allocation of fishing rights with the Mi'kmaq in Canada and the Saami in North Norway.

Aboriginal fishing rights are said to pose a challenge to the authoritative claims of the state as the final arbiters in respect of access and participation in rights-based regimes.

Grants are somewhat analogous to a "homestead", in which settlers who developed farms in the American wilderness eventually received title without payment to what had been public land.

[16] Note however that the television industry did not have to pay for the necessary spectrum to switch from analog to digital broadcasting, which is more like quota grants for incumbent fishermen.

Another issue with tradability is that large enterprises may buy all the quotas, ending what may be a centuries-long tradition of small-scale operations.

Consolidation of quota accompanies every IFQ programme, and typically works to phase out smaller, less profitable fishing operations in favour of larger, often corporate-owned fleets who have better financing capabilities.

A lack of regulatory policy or enforcement still results in the prevalence of "armchair fishermen" (those who own quota but do not materially participate in the fishery).

Highgrading involves catching more fish than the quota allows and dumping specimens that are less valuable because of size, age or other criteria.

[21][22] A study of the 14 IFQ programmes in the United States revealed that fish stocks are unaffected by these management schemes.

Today, due to the pre-allocation of catch that accompanies IFQs, the season lasts nearly eight months and boats deliver fresh fish at a steadier pace.

Supporters also say that the current system has successfully ensured the sustainability of Icelandic fish stocks and led to prosperity.

[36][37] The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act defines individual transferable quotas (ITQs) as permits to harvest specific quantities of fish of a particular species.

[2] Starting in January 2011, fishermen in California, Oregon and Washington will operate via tradeable catch shares.

Goals of the system include increased productivity, reduced waste, and higher revenues for fishermen.

Initial recipients of quota receive windfall profits through the gifting of share ownership, while all future entrants are forced to purchase or lease the right to harvest fish.

Many have questioned both the ethical and economic repercussions of dedicating a secure, exclusive privilege to access this public resource.

Since quota acquisition is often beyond the financial means of many fishermen, they are forced to sacrifice substantial portions of their income in order to lease fishing rights.

[42] The transition to IFQ management tends to cause considerable economic harm to coastal communities that are dependent on commercial fisheries.

This cost results from the re-equilibration of the quota-regime market, revealing the inefficient over-investment that had taken place in the industry prior to implementation of the quota regime.