Indus Waters Treaty

[1][2][3][4] It was signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and then Pakistani president Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

[7][8] The treaty allows India to use the water of Western Rivers for limited irrigation use and unlimited non-consumptive use such as power generation, navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc.

The preamble of the treaty recognises the rights and obligations of each country for the optimum water use from the Indus System of Rivers in a spirit of goodwill, friendship and cooperation.

Per Article 5.1 of IWT, India agreed to make a fixed contribution of UK Pound Sterling 62,060,000/= (Pound Sterling sixty-two million and sixty thousand only or 125 metric tons of gold when gold standard was followed) towards the cost of construction of new head-works and canal system for irrigation from western rivers in Punjab province of Pakistan.

The commission has survived three wars and provides an ongoing mechanism for consultation and conflict resolution through inspection, exchange of data, and visits.

The commission is required to meet at least once a year to discuss potential disputes as well as cooperative arrangements for the development of the Indus system of rivers.

[32] The waters of the Indus system of rivers begin mainly in Tibet and the Himalayan mountains in the states of Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.

[37] The partition of British India, based on religion not on geography basis, created a conflict over the waters of the Indus basin.

Pakistan felt its livelihood threatened by the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the basin.

Where India certainly had its own ambitions for the profitable development of the basin, Pakistan felt acutely threatened by a conflict over the main source of water for its cultivable land.

[40] This accord required India to release sufficient water through existing canals to the Pakistani regions of the basin in return for annual payments from the government of Pakistan.

Pakistan wanted to take the matter at that time to the International Court of Justice, but India refused, arguing that the conflict required a bilateral resolution.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, formerly the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, visited the region to write a series of articles for Collier's magazine.

With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production.

In the article, I suggested that the World Bank might use its good offices to bring the parties to an agreement and help in the financing of an Indus Development program.

India's previous objections to third party arbitration were remedied by the Bank's insistence that it would not adjudicate the conflict but rather work as a conduit for agreement.

In his correspondence with Indian and Pakistan leaders, Black asserted that the Indus dispute could most realistically be solved if the functional aspects of disagreement were negotiated apart from political considerations.

In his opening statement to the Working Party, Black spoke of why he was optimistic about the group's success:One aspect of Mr. Lilienthal's proposal appealed to me from the first.

Finally, in 1954, after nearly two years of negotiation, the World Bank offered its own proposal, stepping beyond the limited role it had apportioned for itself and forcing the two sides to consider concrete plans for the future of the basin.

This new distribution did not account for the historical usage of the Indus basin or the fact that West Punjab's Eastern districts could turn into deserts, and repudiated Pakistan's negotiating position.

[52] One of the last stumbling blocks to an agreement concerning financing for the construction of canals and storage facilities that would transfer water from the western rivers to Pakistan.

An Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement (Karachi, 19 September 1960); a treaty between Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRDC) and Pakistan who agreed to provide Pakistan a combination of funds and loans.

However, surcharge storage behind the gated spillway in a RoR project is not limited which is useful to store water during the monsoon season for optimum secondary power generation.

Union Minister of State for Jal Shakti Rattan Lal Kataria said that "every effort is made" to stop the flow of water downstream from the three assigned rivers.

[71][72] In violation of IWT Article IV(10), the LBOD's purpose is to prevent the saline and polluted water flow into the Indus delta of Pakistan and divert to reach the sea via the Rann of Kutch area.

[81] However, India decided to restart the Tulbul Project on the Jhelum River in the Kashmir Valley, which was previously suspended in response to Pakistan's objections.

In addition, India is entitled to use Western River's waters for limited agricultural uses and unlimited domestic, non-consumptive, hydropower generation, etc.

[17] There is scope for cooperation between both countries to supply this water to the Kutch region of India via Pakistan rivers, Sukkur Barrage pond and Nara delta channel to Shakoor Lake.

[91][47] The water transfer tunnels would also substantially enhance the hydropower generation from the existing power stations on Ravi and Beas rivers which is permitted by the provisions of IWT.

[117] Qamar, M.U., Azmat, M. & Claps, P. Pitfalls in transboundary Indus Water Treaty: a perspective to prevent unattended threats to the global security.