Intelligence-led policing

In the U.S., Mark Riebling's 1994 book Wedge - The Secret War between the FBI and CIA spotlighted the conflict between law enforcement and intelligence, and urged cops to become "more like spies."

Intelligence-led policing gained considerable momentum globally following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

It was perceived that police were spending too much time responding to specific incidents, and not tackling the problem of repeat offenders.

Therefore, reports by the Audit Commission[4] in 1993 and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in 1997 advocated increased use of intelligence, surveillance and informants to target recidivist offenders, so that police could be more effective in fighting crime.

As shown by the figure below,the three I's call for close cooperation between police chiefs and intelligence analysts in order to facilitate a strategy that will impact the criminal environment.

The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) which was introduced in 2003 contained 28 recommendations for major changes to policing and a process of collecting data.

Intelligence-led policing gained its momentum in the 1970s, when the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals announced that every law enforcement agency should immediately create system for gathering and analyzing data.

[15] The post-9/11 environment in the US, the "era of Homeland Security" for American policing,[16] has increased demands for law enforcement to build global partnerships and to work more closely with local agencies to expand the capacity of the state to fight both crime and terrorism.

Investigations following bombings of the rail systems in Madrid and London and the arrest of suspected terrorists in Canada, Britain, and Florida suggested[according to whom?]

We seek to prioritize according to these variables, to fashion a series of preventive and protective steps that increase security at multiple levels.

Riebling's model leverages both Israeli counter-terrorist tactics, and the NYPD's Broken Windows policing theories.

Among the Broken Windows mechanisms, Riebling's doctrine blends problem solving, environmental design, community policing, and public-private partnerships.

Analyzing the operations of the Israeli National Police in Tel Aviv, Riebling notes approvingly that "investigation of the incident, even a traffic accident, is secondary to the number one goal—which is gathering intelligence.

"For instance, when they raided a bordello, where the patrons were primarily Arabs from different parts of the region, Israeli police were less concerned about the criminal activity, than with preparing intelligence reports on who these people were, and how they got into Israel.

[citation needed] The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats.

Although there are substantive differences in the concepts, the similarities serve as reliable policy experiences to make implementation of ILP a functional reality" (p. 322) In the Canadian context, the lineage of intelligence-led policing can be traced to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s failure to prevent the 1985 bombing of Air India flight 182.

This was an impetus for the adoption of community policing, but it was soon realized that the focus on “community” was a distraction in that hardened targets are not easily penetrated through better police-community relations; rather, it is the “mode of information that is important.”[1] Consequently, the RCMP developed its CAPRA model (Clients, Analysis, Partnerships, Response, Assessment), which fits with, and has been re-cast as, intelligence-led policing.

There is also a growing recognition[citation needed] within policing that external agencies may hold the key to long-term crime reduction.

These agencies, such as local councils, housing authorities, and health and education departments, are believed to have a greater potential to impact a wider range of causal factors.

[22] As agencies share information amongst each other, a larger "network of intelligence" is created, which proponents hope, when used effectively, will cause a substantial decrease in crime.

[15] The United States Supreme Court has not made any particular decisions in relation to searches that deal specifically with intelligence-led policing.

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf Elements of Terrorism Preparedness in Local Police Agencies, 2003-2007: Impact of Vulnerability, Organizational Characteristics, and Contagion in the Post-9/11 Era